FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Daily Report
Supplement

Central Eurasia

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FBIS-SOV-95-120-S
Thursday
22 June 1995

Central Eurasia
SUPPLEMENT

FBIS-SOV-95-120-S 22 June 1995

CONTENTS

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RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political Issues

*Political Parties, Candidates Presidential Chances Tabulated *[SEGODNYA 8 Jun]* 1
Chernomyrdin Career, Intrigues Profiled *[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI 21-28 May]* 4
*'My Fatherland' Member Assekritov on Objectives *[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 7 Jun]* 7
*Duma Deputy Chairman on Moving Capital From Moscow *[PRAVDA-5 2-9 Jun]* 13
*Sergey Kovalev on Human Rights Activities *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA 31 May]* 14

Media Issues

*Report on Fourth Congress of Russian Journalists' Union *[OBSHCHAYA GAZETA 4-10 May]* 17
*St Petersburg TV Program on ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Discussed *[OBSHCHAYA GAZETA 4-10 May]* 19

Military & Space Issues

Rocket Design Bureau Chief on Conversion *[DELOVOY MIR 8 Jun]* 21

Regional Affairs

*Sverdlovsk Oblast's Gubernatorial Elections 23
*Presidential Edict *[OBLASTNAYA GAZETA 19 May]* 23
*Ruling on Regional Electoral Commission *[OBLASTNAYA GAZETA 19 May]* 23
*Resolution Defines Dates of Actions *[OBLASTNAYA GAZETA 19 May]* 24
*Oblast Duma Session Comments *[OBLASTNAYA GAZETA 19 May]* 24
*Russian Exodus From Dagestan Examined *[ROSSIYA 17-23 May]* 25
*Payment Defaults Major Problem in Kuban *[DELOVOY MIR 14 Jun]* 27
*Former Vladivostok Mayor on Conflict With Kray Authorities *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 7 Jun]* 27

Political Issues

*Political Parties, Candidates Presidential Chances Tabulated

954E1093A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 8 Jun 95 p 3

[Article by Leonid Sedov, VTsION [All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion]: "On Positions of the Parties Preceding the Duma Elections; Four Percent of Russians Will Not Vote Against Boris Yeltsin 'Under Any Circumstances'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, a large part of the party electorates is becoming consolidated around their leaders. At the same time, the potential electorate of Boris Yeltsin and Viktor Chernomyrdin is lost in confusion between the existing parties, comprising a minority in many of them, although a notable one. Thus, within the electorate of the RDC [Democratic Choice of Russia], which participated in the last elections in the role of the "governmental" party, today only one person out of six lists President Yeltsin among the leaders who instill the greatest confidence (one in two name Yegor Gaydar in this capacity, and one in eight—Viktor Chernomyrdin). One other electorate in which there is a noticeable minority of "Yeltsinites" is that of the PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord], where the president's supporters number 16 percent. Somewhat more preferable is the position of Viktor Chernomyrdin, who gets a whole 20 percent of those "expressing confidence" in him within the APR [Agrarian Party of Russia] (an equal number here also express confidence in Mr. Yavlinskiy, Gaydar and Zaveryukha), and 24 percent in the PRES, where the leading position is nevertheless firmly held by Sergey Shakhray, with 60 percent of the overall confidence.

The PRES and a number of other leading parties are listed among the "leader-type" parties, i.e., they are consolidated around one primary figure. These are primarily "Yabloko," in whose electorate 78 percent express their confidence in Grigoriy Yavlinskiy. (It is characteristic that Vladimir Lukin, who also gave his name to a block, gets only 1.2 percent of the mention in his own party, even less than in "Women of Russia," where his indicator is 2.9 percent). Then there is "Derzhava" ["Great Power"] (Aleksandr Rutskoy—76 percent), the LDPR [Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia] (Vladimir Zhirinovskiy—63 percent), the RDC (Yegor Gaydar—50 percent), the PNS [National Salvation Party] (Svyatoslav Fedorov—45 percent), and the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] (Gennadiy Zyuganov—44 percent). Of notable interest is the gradual evolution of the CPRF with the growth of Mr. Zyuganov's influence within the party itself, as well as with his increased rating among the population: It is evolving from a party of the non-leadership, "program" type into a leader-type party.

According to the status for March of 1995, only the above-mentioned parties, plus "Women of Russia" and—with a high degree of doubt—the APR will be able to overcome the 5-percent barrier to secure a place in the membership list of the Duma. The number of votes, in percent of the overall number of voters, is presented in the table. The parties are ranked in diminishing order, by number of votes.

Which of the parties reflects your interests? (in % of sampling)

Name of Party	Surveys		
	N-1980	"Express-4", N-1593	"Express-5", N-1598
CPRF	8.7	7.2	6.5
"Yabloko"	7.8	9.7	8.2
LDPR	7.3	5.4	5.5
"Women of Russia"	5.9	4.1	4.4
PNS	4.2	4.4	6.6
RDC	4.0	2.6	5.2
PRES	2.4	2.3	2.7
APR	2.4	2.3	2.9
"Derzhava"	2.2	2.9	2.2
"Onward, Russia"	-	2.1	6.1
"Beer Lovers Party"	1.5	1.2	2.2

Unlike the indicators from the "Express-4" survey, the position of the RDC in April seems to be slightly stronger, although sixth place on the list is not overly inspiring. "Derzhava," on the other hand, is falling into the dangerous "impassable" zone.

We should note that the April data speak of a significant increase in public interest toward the upcoming elections. The number of persons announcing their refusal to participate in the upcoming elections or having difficulty in naming the party which they choose has dropped by 12 points as compared with March. This is a result of the increased volume of pre-electoral thematics in the mass media, as well as the emergence of

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new parties on the political arena, among which is "Onward, Russia," which has made a sharp upward leap and taken fourth place in the electoral list. In April, the moderately reformationist PNS and "Women of Russia" also gained votes. Their position on the left wing of the reformationist field evidently allows all three of these listed parties to take away part of the votes from the CPRF, and part from "Yabloko." The leader of the "Onward, Russia" Movement, Boris Fedorov, according to the indicators of the presidential race, has risen to a very high position, almost equal to Grigoriy Yavlinskiy. Mr. Fedorov is given preference primarily by the older age groups, pensioners, as well as persons with very high income. His principles of statehood lead to the fact that not only are part of the voters from the electorates of Mr. Zhirinovskiy, "Women of Russia," and supporters of Mr. Barkashov and Anpilov on his side, but also those from the electorate of "Demrossiya" (not RDC). However, the replentishment of the reformationist camp, if we relate the parties of both Fedorovs to such, is taking place primarily at the expense of those who have no sympathies for the former complement of political parties represented in the Duma.

The complement of participants in the pre-electoral race, evidently, will still undergo extensive changes. We may expect the emergence of new parties and electoral associations, formulated under "vacant leaders." Among such leaders is primarily the president himself. According to the survey data, today he retains approximately 4 percent (of the population) of solid supporters. Four percent state that they would not vote against Boris Yeltsin under any circumstances. Four percent name him among the leaders enjoying the greatest confidence: By this indicator he has dropped to ninth place (Yavlinskiy has 14 percent, Zhirinovskiy—7 percent, Zyuganov—7 percent, Gaydar—7 percent, S. Fedorov—6 percent, Rutskoy—6 percent, Shakhray—6 percent, and Chernomyrdin—5 percent), while 3 percent fully support all his actions. This small but solid contingent of pro-presidential electors either will not vote for the party lists, or else find it difficult to ascribe themselves to some specific party (Fig. 1).

We see that one-third of the voters who have confidence in Boris Yeltsin do not intend to vote for any of the parties. Thirty percent intend to give their votes to the parties of the democratic spectrum (RDC, "Yabloko," PNS); another 7 percent intend to vote for other parties (primarily also of a democratic ilk: DPR, PRES, etc.); 18 percent intend to vote for the centrists ("Women of Russia," PRES), and 10 percent will vote for the LDPR. Among those who have confidence in President Yeltsin, there are practically none who intend to vote for the CPRF, "Derzhava" and the APR. For comparison, let us present an analogous diagram for the 14 percent (of the population) who express confidence in Grigoriy Yavlinskiy (Figure 2).

Figure 1. Supporters of various parties in the group of those who express full confidence in Yeltsin (in % of the number of respondents)



Key: 1 - RDC; 2 - "Yabloko"; 3 - LDPR; 4 - PRES; 5 - "Women of Russia"; 6 - PNS; 7 - Other parties; 8 - No such party; 9 - Difficult to say.

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Figure 2. Supporters of various parties in the group of those who express full confidence in Yavlinskiy (in % of the number of respondents)



Key: 1 - RDC; 2 - "Yabloko" 3 - LDPR; 4 - PRES; 5 - "Women of Russia"; 6 - PNS; 7 - APR; 8 - CPRF; 9 - "Derzhava"; 10 - Other parties; 11 - No such party; 12 - Difficult to say.

It is clearly evident that the number of those who do not know which party to choose is significantly smaller here, while the number of those voting for the "democrats," primarily the "Yabloko" supporters, is significantly higher, and the relative share of those who intend to vote for the communist-patriotic parties is rather high (17 percent). The amazingly small percent (2 percent) of those voting for the RDC is surprising. Especially since, in the analogous group of those expressing confidence in Gaydar, around one-fifth of his proponents intend to cast their votes for "Yabloko," and 30 percent for the RDC. These data speak of the fact that the shift in favor of Grigoriy Yavlinskiy is becoming obvious in the democratic movement. Also oriented toward him is a notable part of the voters from the electorates of the irreconcilable opposition (15 percent of the voters from the CPRF and 11 from "Derzhava").

Be that as it may, the 4 percent who firmly support Yeltsin may serve as a sufficient base if not for the presidential, then for the parliamentary elections. The politicians who understand this and who have made an effort to create a "universal" party organization oriented toward the president, the government and the present political course comprise the "Our House—Russia" Movement.

According to the data of surveys conducted among urban residents, performed prior to the organizational formulation of the party initiative of the authorities, the NDR has fairly good chances of winning part of the electorate of the PRES and the APR, gathering under its banners the electors voting in the past elections for the DPR [Democratic Party of Russia], "Civic Union," KEDR [Cedar - Constructive Ecological Movement of Russia], etc. The prime minister's movement may take away up to 13 percent from "Derzhava." Its chances look best among a certain portion of the managers, among the military circles, among the strata of the population with a low education but receiving rather high income (at a level of 700,000 -800,000 rubles (R) per person per month), and in the northern regions of the European part of Russia. These people evaluate their position as being good or moderate, but are concerned by the possibility of its deterioration.

As for the other "vacant" leaders, these, for the present day and according to their position in the ratings, may become Mrr. Lebed, Sobchak, Pamfilova, B. Fedorov, Luzhkov and Kozyrev. General Lebed has already been attracted to the right-centrist coalition with the participation of the DPR (Glazyev), the Federation of Commodity Producers (Skokov) and the Congress of Russian Communities (Rogozin). His image as an honest but strict and authoritarian leader capable of bringing about order meets the social demand to a high degree. His electorate is comprised of men 25-40 years of age, white-collar workers without special education, military men, workers, people with low income (R200,000 - R400,000), and residents of the

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southern regions of the European part of Russia who consider their earnings stable and moderate.

At the same time, many people still do not intend to participate in the elections or will vote for the exotic parties such as the "Beer Lovers Party" or the party of Aleksey Kazannik. The image of Ella Pamfilova, who embodies the ideal of "humane compassion and social justice" appeals to yet another type of social aspirations.

There is, however, also another means of party unification of the non-leader type, representing the broadest possible strata of the population and identified by some "ascriptive" indicator. A good example of this type may be the "Women of Russia" Party. An unsuccessful example is the "Future of Russia—New Names" Party, which represented the youth and was unsuccessful in the elections.

A third type of party, also a non-leader party in the sense that its formation does not presuppose the existence of a leader who is highly placed in the elite and who gathers the party "under himself," is the party of the professional- or institutional-corporate type. At the present time, according to the data of all the surveys, there are three institutions which retain public confidence in the country: The church, the mass media and the army. In this connection, political organizations which speak out in the name of and with the blessing of these institutions may expect some success.

We may also point out other professional corporations capable of implementing the formation of their political associations, which have chances of successfully entering the elections. (For example, the corporation of jurists, which speaks out with a program of struggle for a legal society, or a party of financial capital, headed by one of the prominent bankers or by a group of bank managers).

Finally, the mass of "deceived investors" may become, and is already becoming, a gold mine for getting votes. Two newly formed parties are already grazing on this field. If they are able not only to attract to their side the victims of the "pyramid schemes" and bankrupt commercial banks, but also to convince of their effectiveness those who at the onset of reform lost their savings, they will have broad support and will be able to achieve significant results in the elections. It is quite probable that the CPRF and the LDPR may form blocks with these parties at the stage of the pre-electoral campaign.

Chernomyrdin Career, Intrigues Profiled

954F2573A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 21-28 May 95 No 36, p 4

[Article by Azer Mursaliyev under "Portrait" rubric: "House Manager: Chernomyrdin and 'Gazprom' Make World History']

[FBIS Translated Text] **Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin is a person who takes things step by step. In accordance with his reputation of being a "strong man" and a "kind boss," he does not talk much but does a lot. His entire career is like the methodical construction of an enormous house. It is no accident that precisely this word figures in the name of the Chernomyrdin bloc: "Our House—Russia." And perhaps those jokers are wrong who renamed it "Our House—Gazprom," because Gazprom is a house that Viktor Stepanovich built with his own hands. And the elections will show whether Gazprom will become a house for all of Russia.**

Viktor Stepanovich possesses a quality that has helped him his entire life to be at the right place at the right time.

The Beginning

Chernomyrdin found perestroyka in the post of minister of the gas industry of the USSR. And he himself proposed the elimination of his own ministry, transforming it into a concern. Utilizing the protection of Nikolay Ryzhkov, Chernomyrdin gained control over all export deliveries of gas and within three years he turned Gazprom into one of the largest companies in the world.

AFter the coming to power of reformers who were proposing the breaking up of the fuel and energy complex, Chernomyrdin took the defense, arguing that the reorganization of the concern would lead to the destruction of the gas industry. On the other hand, the disintregation of the USSR gave rise to the threat of the loss of monopoly control over export lines. The first "war" took place with Turkmenistan, which demanded that Gazprom give it its share of foreign exchange from the export of gas to the West. But it received a decisive refusal. Then came the "gas" wars with Ukraine, which tried to play on the fact that the gas line to Europe passes through its territory. The concern was victorious in the "gas wars."

Restoration of the Empire

The demonstration of strength proved successful. By presidential edict on 30 May 1992, Chernomyrdin was appointed vice premier for the fuel and energy complex

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and within six months he became premier in place of Gaydar, who had been acting premier.

His first steps were clumsy: one of his first decisions was the prohibition of the driving of vehicles with a steering wheel on the right side, which was repealed on the eve of the April referendum in 1993, and a decree on the state regulation of prices, which evoked sharp statements by Shokhin, Gaydar, Shumeyko, and Chubays. He revoked it last week, called it "not well thought out."

In another area, however, his actions were well conceived. Chernomyrdin introduced some changes to the cabinet. When he came to it, he immediately installed another telephone with the inscription Gazprom. In February, the transfer prices for gas were increased by a factor of almost five. On the eve of the April referendum, he freed the oil and gas complex from the payment of export and in part import duties and then from the obligatory sale of part of the foreign exchange receipts.

After breaking the opposition of Chubays' Committee for the Management of State Property, which had proposed the establishment of many small competing joint-stock oil companies, Chernomyrdin together with Yuriy Safranik, whom he appointed minister of fuel and energy, reorganized the petroleum branch in his own way. Thanks to their efforts, the Russian petroleum giants LUKoil, YuKOC, Sidanko, and others grew and became the equal of Gazprom. The result was the rise of a powerful ramified fuel and energy empire. Gazprom, which has monopolized 95 percent of the production of natural gas and a network of export gas pipelines from all countries of the CIS, provides, along with the oil companies, for up to half of all foreign exchange receipts to the treasury. Its own banks service the contracts. The best known of them is Imperial, the controlling package of shares of which belongs to the founders Gazprom and LUKoil. Thus, a powerful financial and industrial group has arisen—the financial resources accumulated by the fuel and energy giants are being invested in profitable projects in different branches.

The former fraternal republics were the first to feel Moscow's new course. The Chernomyrdin government dramatically cut the quotas for deliveries of oil to them and at the beginning of March 1993 it called its neighbors to the "energy carpet" in Surgut, stating emphatically: If you need supplemental deliveries, invest in the Russian fuel and energy complex.

While the politicians argued about Russia's new course, Chernomyrdin set it up. The essence of this policy is precisely expressed by the Gazprom slogan: "What is good for Gazprom is good for Russia as well." And this is no accident. Precisely the fuel and energy complex was the preserver and bearer of the spirit of power in a time of crisis. At the same time that Russian troops were being withdrawn from abroad, Gazprom went on a determined offensive in Europe, squeezing the German company Ruhrgas, and LUKoil gained a piece of the Caspian shelf from the Western consortium.

Chernomyrdin also made some changes in Russian diplomacy, making it predominantly economic. Essentially he did not make a single foreign trip that did not somehow involve the problem of the fuel and energy complex. Nor was the premier's most recent trip to Sofia an exception. In the course of that trip, there was discussion of an agreement on the building of gas pipeline through Bulgaria and Greece.

Flogging the 'Laboratory Heads'

After wavering for almost half a year between the president and parliament and demonstrably distancing himself from politics, Chernomyrdin openly took the side of the president in the course of the summer and fall confrontation between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet. It was precisely Chernomyrdin who took over the real means of control in the night of the 3rd to the 4th of October. It was he who ordered the switching off of "Ostankino" television broadcasts and it was he who went to Grachev to demand the intervention of the army. The premier's resolve was rewarded: after the abolition of the post of vice president, Chernomyrdin was declared the official successor to the president in the event that the latter loses the capacity to manage the state.

At the very beginning of the election campaign in 1993, Volskiy, Shakhray, and others tried to bring the premier onto their team. But Chernomyrdin cut them off: "The government must above all work and not be distracted by politics." He left the playing of the role of the "party of power" to Shakhray's PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord] and to Gaydar's "Russia's Choice."

The defeat of the people from "Russia's Choice" made it possible for Chernomyrdin to declare: "It was not the government that lost but the members of the government. The defeat in the elections was a personal assessment of the work of Gaydar and Chubays. So they must think. There is something for them to think about." The statement was followed by actions. Gaydar abandoned the post of vice premier and Chernomyrdin set about to reform the government, as a result of which some of the liberals left. At a meeting of the government on 4 March 1994, Chernomyrdin came down hard on the former "laboratory heads," who come in for a landing" and then the "whole country is shaken."

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But this was the end of the premier's attack against the radicals. Moreover Chernomyrdin had no need for a complete rout of the reform wing. It was possible and necessary to utilize the remnants of someone else's army in a new fight, this time with the conservative wing, which is more and more closely linked with the Kremlin.

A New Threat

In contrast to his transition government, by the beginning of 1994 Chernomyrdin had ceased to be a transition figure. It had become obvious by that time that Chernomyrdin was becoming the probable candidate for the place of Yeltsin's next opponent, vacant since 4 October 1993, after the "Gorbachev center" and the "Khasbulatov parliament." In NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's February rating of the 100 most influential politicians, Chernomyrdin occupied first place, ahead of Yeltsin.

Knowing the atmosphere of the political leaders, he declined this honor at that same meeting on 4 March. But raising his voice indignantly, he said: "There is no need to incite us to fight with the president." Chernomyrdin could not fail to understand that his adjuration will hardly help him. Moreover he previously had prepared himself for such a turn, cautiously removing the "Yeltsin people." After a successful fight with Oleg Lobov, Chernomyrdin took hold of Shumeyko. It was not without his help that Shumeyko was moved to the Council of the Federation.

The increasing conflicts between the president and the government were inevitable. Joining with the president's entourage, branch lobbyists headed by Oleg Soskovets, who back in 1993 had been considered to be "Chernomyrdin's man," began an attack against the premier's fortifications. Soskovets undertook the first attacks against the positions of the oil corporations. In this situation, Chernomyrdin turned to yesterday's opponents, began to support the liberals and market people, and appointed Aleksandr Shokhin as first vice premier.

By the summer of 1994, the fight with the premier began to splash beyond the corridors of power. On 8 June, rumors about the coming resignation of Chernomyrdin began to spread. Skokov and Soskovets were named as possible successors. Literally the next day, the president's press secretary Vyacheslav Kostikov denied the rumors, calling them an "invention and a lie." In September, Kostikov denied those same rumors a second time.

'Black Tuesday'

Chernomyrdin went on vacation in October. "Black Tuesday" came on 11 October. The financial crisis threatened to become a political crisis, The president, having dismissed the acting minister of finance, appointed a commission headed by Chernomyrdin's old opponent Oleg Lobov, secretary of the Security Council, to investigate the reasons for "black Tuesday." The premier immediately returned to Moscow but the president sent him away to "finish his vacation." The next day, Chernomyrdin's ally Viktor Gerashenko, chairman of the Central Bank, was dismissed.

Within a week after "black Tuesday," the radio station "Echo of Moscow" reported that Chernomyrdin had asked to be relieved from his office. Not having finished his vacation after all, the premier returned to Moscow and even at the airport he denied the latest rumor about his resignation, saying that the names of those behind "black Tuesday" were well known: "They are people who have lost all conscience and who put their own interests well above the interests of the country." But instead of him, that same day Lobov named names in his report, accusing commercial banks, including Imperial and Most-Bank, of destabilizing the financial market. He thereby indirectly accused the political figures Chernomyrdin and Luzhkov associated with these banks.

Two Olegs, Lobov and Soskovets, are continuing to pressure the premier. It was Soskovets instead of Chernomyrdin who met the British Queen when she arrived in Moscow. Then the Duma subjected the government to a vote of confidence. They were 31 votes short of being able to dismiss Chernomyrdin. After enduring the blow, the premier prepared for a counterattack. On 10 November, the Association of Russian Banks made an appeal to Lobov in which they noted that "the report does not contain any specific accusations of illegal actions by commercial banks" and raised this accusation against him: "A number of statements undermine the business reputation of Russian commercial banks." The next day, in a meeting with the country's leading bankers, Chernomyrdin dotted his "i's": "The banks acted the way that they are supposed to act in adapting to the laws of the market. No one intends to set the bankers against the course of reform. This is advantageous to those who are not concerned about the future of Russia."

In the spring of 1995, the word expressed in defense of the banks was returned a hundred fold: the proposal of banking consortiums to the government and the willingness to finance the election campaign of the Chernomyrdin bloc.

Raid

The war of the president's forces against Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov and their measured offensive

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in union with Soskovets against the positions of the premier forced Chernomyrdin to concern himself with support in the West as well. After have made rather sharp statements against monetarism at the beginning of his premiership, Chernomyrdin declared on 24 March 1995 at the extended meeting of the government in the Kremlin: "If we again let ourselves be convinced that we just have to add some money, get the printing press going a little, and everything will be fine, then we will just have to forget about economic reform."

And the West reacted. As an indicator of the immutability of the reform course in Russia, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher pointed out the fact that Chernomyrdin was still at his post.

As always, Chernomyrdin conducted himself cautiously and skillfully in the Chechnya conflict as well. After waiting quite a while, on 16 January he spoke on television about the events in Chechnya. Viktor Stepanovich generally loves to wait and that is why his words become much weightier without being absorbed in the general chorus of voices.

Did Something Terrible Happen?

By that time it was already clear that it would not be possible simply to dispatch the powerful premier, who in three years had gone from being the gas king of Russia to the fuel and energy emperor. It is still unknown where he will be more dangerous, in the chair of premier or in the opposition.

In the meantime, the time is approaching for new elections in parliament and after that for presidential elections, and it is more than problematical that Yeltsin will win them. Under the conditions of the steady fall in the president's rating, it is very likely that the Russian elite will back Chernomyrdin to prevent the coming to power of "strangers" like Zyugan or Yavlinskiy. The continuity of power will be guaranteed in such an event but not for all. Some of those closest to Yeltsin will clearly not prosper in this event.

And in this situation, a multiple-pronged plan is coming to a head in the Kremlin: to push the premier into participating in the parliamentary elections. On the one hand, there are clearly prospects of a "party of power" in the presidential elections, whereas on the other—in the event of the failure of "Our House"—Chernomyrdin risks repeating the fate of Yegor Gaydar and of being forced, after resigning, to lead some propane or butane group in the State Duma.

While visiting Magnitogorsk on 27 April, Chernomyrdin crossed the Rubicon and declared his intention to establish an election bloc and to enter the election campaign. But it is thereby obvious that the thread linking the two poles of power all of this time—the president and the premier—had been stretched to the limit. And one cannot rule out the possibility that in the coming months it will break and Chernomyrdin, who began as the president's protege, will come to the finish line as an independent politician.

***'My Fatherland' Member Assekritov on Objectives**

954F2540A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Jun 95 p 10

[Article by Stanislav Assekritov, member of the Coordinating Council of the My Fatherland social and political organization: "Great Russia Is the Goal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia is experiencing very hard times. Hard by virtue of the social and economic crisis, hard because of the internecine political strife and the unabating fire of interethnic conflicts, hard in the sense of the unpredictability of many events and their consequences. An election campaign is beginning at this complex time also. The number of participants in this marathon is growing, and the rules of the game are as yet insufficiently clear. Some people are beginning to interpret them in their own way.

This is why it is essential to declare an emphatic protest against Mr. Chernomyrdin, the leader of the power party. At the constituent congress of "his home" he insulted, in my view, all the parties and movements that have not succumbed to his directive concerning membership of the government bloc and are going their own way. I will remind you of his words: "It is not we who are organizing—others are doing the organizing. Those who are incapable of governing not only the country but themselves also. Those who would plunge the country and its economy into another experiment, inevitably pushing society toward dictatorship." Had these words been uttered by Barkashov or Anpilov, they could have been ignored. But when extremist statements are made by the leader of the party personifying the official supreme authorities, this is too serious a matter. It is cynicism elevated to a principle of political struggle.

The My Fatherland association, as, equally, other parties and movements, can prove quite cogently and professionally the utter bankruptcy and incompetence of the current government. It is this government that has cast Russia's economy back dozens of years and has by its actions caused damage surpassing the losses in the years of the Great Patriotic War. Not some secret forces but Messrs Gaydar, Chubays, and Fedorov specifically initiated cruel experiments on the people, and Mr. Chernomyrdin with that same Chubays continued them and long since established his own dictatorship. Its most striking manifestation has been the war in Chechnya.

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What is the point of intimidating people with the idea of dictatorship when it actually exist throughout the system of the executive?

Evaluating the deplorable results of the activity of the present authorities, it may be assumed that:

1. They either hate Russia and the people inhabiting it so strongly that they will endeavor by might and main to conclusively finish off its entire natural, scientific, technical, personnel, and economic potential, including, of course, its spirituality and culture. Such an appalling thought arises when one sees how against the background of the destructive processes decisions are being adopted that are intensifying the negative trends even further and, most important, insistently driving the long-suffering people of Russia into indigence, bondage, and an abyss of fear;

2. Or they have a scenario of the composition of some model of the state with a pseudo-market, truncated economy. There truly are such models, and the consumer market is saturated, there are no lines or commodity shortages, the main market institutions are present, and there are signs of the democratic form of rule within their framework, it might seem. But the only thing is that all this will be subordinated to and dependent on other, more powerful states. Authorities are present, it would seem, but are operating to dictation from outside. A very realistic topic, if it is considered that it is the fourth year now that all the scripts have been written out for Russia by the International Monetary Fund.

No, we are not talking about a colony in the direct sense. Quite a bit more money has to be spent to convert a great power into a raw material appendage. To explore new deposits and to create the production and social infrastructure around them. This all takes money, and a considerable amount of money, at that. This is why there is as yet a process of the simple squandering of the national wealth via clan-corruption channels. A process of the enrichment of a small grouping of persons at the expense of the ever more rapid impoverishment of the people.

It does not need to be said, I believe, that neither the first nor the second motives can in any way be justified. Both mean the death of Russia.

The government and the power party emphatically reject all alternative proposals in terms of the strategy and tactics of implementation of reforms in Russia. There continue to be no visible attempts even to discuss any other concepts or programs. Whence the endeavor to pin as quickly as possible a label on the professional, constructive opposition, mix it up in one pile with the unbridled extremists and mass-meeting criticizers, to erect fences between the White House and the ordinary people, and to stop up the voice of the public and the news media.

We came to know this well in the example of the actions of the government bureaucracy. This same format is now being adopted by the party movement with monopoly claims to the truth in the last instance. It will not wash! Such a practice of conducting political struggle is unacceptable in a civilized democratic society.

The My Fatherland association has its own vision of the strategy of transformations in Russian society. We have a program, we have the knowledge and experience of how to implement it.

On what basic principles are we building our platform, what should we make the basis of our day-to-day work?

The first and most important thing is man with his needs, aspirations, concerns, and requirements. The term socially oriented market economy, which has very belatedly been recognized even by the present authorities, remains a hollow sound unless its aim is to pass each decision through the prism of human relations.

We all understand full well, of course, that macroeconomic regulators are ultimately designed to accomplish terrestrial, quotidien tasks at the micro-level. But tell us, pray, what kind of ordinary workhorse who has not been paid for six months is today concerned about the heated argument over the percentage of inflation—5 percent or 10 percent? He has nothing with which to feed his family, the kindergarten has to be paid for, his children need to be sent on vacation.

Yes, galloping inflation devalues the already paltry wage, yes, it kills off any notion of capital investments. But reducing it to zero against the background of the savage fall in production and the closure of a mass of enterprises cannot be made an end in itself.

We are convinced that inflation can and should be controlled. And were it even 20 percent a month, but the enterprises began to operate and pay wages here—this would be a normal controlled process.

We recognize that the release into circulation of an additional money supply does not strengthen the ruble. But we cannot, on the other hand, violate economic laws and reduce the situation to the absurd, when the commodity supply is backed by money only to the extent of 50 percent. There is a mass of reasons for the arrears crisis, but one of the most important is the shortage of working assets.

Boris Fedorov, former minister of finance and currently a presidential candidate, engendered the barbaric

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method of combating inflation—not paying people on the public payroll. What had the teachers, doctors, and scientists done wrong that economies had to be made from their pockets? The answer is simple—the intelligentsia was a very patient, submissive mass. They are not miners. But such a corrupt policy is amoral and fraught with the danger of a social explosion. And it is easy to imagine the sort of situation in which we would find ourselves were the authors of such a policy to come to power.

The state is duty bound not only to pay off its debts but also to raise the pay for these categories of citizens. In what other country does a doctor receive less than a metro cleaning lady? Where is there a colony in which a teacher earns 10 times less than a guard at a bank? How can a student from an ordinary nonwealthy family live on a grant of 30,000 rubles if his travel costs more than that? And what do we wish to teach this student?

Why is people's labor not valued with us? Only because man long since ceased to be a part of the state's sphere of interests. Today's authorities have created for themselves the following conditions: give birth overseas, educate their children overseas, receive medical treatment and vacation there also. Here, on the other hand, a thousands-strong armed security army and cars with flashing lights. A caste of untouchables. And they don't give a damn for all the rest!

How can there be any question of a housing market and a rent increase if wages, pensions even less, contain nothing other than a loaf of bread and one Validol tablet. The policy of total and general liberalization has led to the creation on the territory of Russia of giant reservations—people from Sakhalin, Chukotka, and Yakutia cannot purchase a ticket to Moscow. They have forgotten what a Black Sea vacation is like.

The reformer radicals have done everything to reach the level of the world price of goods and services, having forgotten about people here. For whom did they think up the "get rich" slogan? For the worker of a state-owned enterprise, for the government functionary? Has the entire population become an entrepreneur to a man?

People need to be given an opportunity to work normally and to receive a normal wage. We need to rectify the most preposterous distortions in its levels. We need to have done with the practice whereby the minimum wage is just about 10 times less than the subsistence level and when pensions and grants are even lower than this minimum wage. This is a policy of the physical extermination of the nation.

Income policy must be emphatically revised, and we advocate this. The percentage of inflation and the amounts of money issue are accounting matters. When the time comes, we will do the accounting. We will find the sources of payment. We will necessarily find them because there are immense reserves in privatization alone. We need to put a decisive end to the squandering of property.

This does not mean that in our policy we are calling for nationalization. Of course not. But the public sector can and should function where this is beneficial to the state and society. A second redivision of property is under way now. It is proceeding barbarically, at a gallop once again, for a pittance once again. The great voucher swindle is affording corrupt and mafia structures to buy up the shares formerly obtained in exchange for candy wrappers.

You do not have to be a Nobel Prize winner to understand that the original accumulation of capital in an economy that is declining in critical fashion inevitably becomes a constant redivision of the diminishing national wealth. Any constructive purposes and motives of the new proprietors are absolutely out of the question. Theft remains theft, regardless of the theory that underpins it.

The government's illusions that this year will be one of the investment activity of the home-grown nouveaux riches are in vain, therefore. The gentlemen are forgetting that not only in Russia but throughout the world ill-gotten money is, in the main, squandered or hidden or "laundered" in other countries. But never does it work for the good of the people.

Nor do we have to go far for examples. In Moscow alone there are already more casinos than in Las Vegas and Monte Carlo put together. The hundred billion accumulated in foreign accounts has no desire to blend as a fresh stream in our putrefying morass. Mercedes, villa-palaces, vacations in the Canaries, foreign insurance—these are the attributes for the prosperous part of society. But it constitutes no more than 3 percent. And the authorities are attempting by this appearance of success Western-style to reassure all those who have been impoverished. Remember the words of Mr. Chernomyrdin, leader of the power party: "Many people are beginning to live a decent life." All these many people may be counted on the fingers of one hand, they are all on the slate of this party.

It may be confidently maintained that a criminal situation has been artificially created in the country for the concentration of capital in the hands of a very small group of nouveaux riches. Today only Chubays knows who has become the owner of the giants of industry, where, and for how much. He alone has the information on where the trillions of rubles from the sale of

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the military engineering assets liberated from the army have gone. As though they did not belong to the state but to him and Pavel Grachev personally.

Nor will you find any details concerning the hundreds of millions of dollars received from the sale and leasing of Russian real estate abroad.

Here are the internal additional sources of the replenishment of the treasury, and they should first and foremost be uncovered and allocated for social needs.

Selling a kindergarten or general clinic for adaptation as a car showroom or a casino is an uncomplicated business. But it is inhumane.

Despite its ardent hymns of praise, Chubays' department has, nonetheless, itself acknowledged its fiasco. This has been somewhat imperceptible, without noise, it is true. But a fact remains a fact. I shall not quote it verbatim but the conclusions from the official report of the State Property Committee for 1994 are such:

enterprise employees have proven to be extremely ineffective owners, foreign investors' interest in us in monetary terms declined this year by a factor of more than 20, stage one was purely a political game, privatization was undertaken for privatization's sake. There you have it, in brief. Total failure. But these belated confessions conceal tremendous economic damage. And its price is great.

And where is the treasury revenue? The federal budget received just R113 billion from privatization in 1994! This is less than the cost of just one small cottage community built in the Arkhangelskoye government dachas zone. Here they are—Chubays' great "contributions" on the scale of all of Russia.

Why not hold the culprits to account? We should, and with all due rigor! Nor may their voluntary confession serve as a mitigating circumstance. Enough of pussyfooting around with them!

We should proceed in our activity primarily from the fact that privatization is a most powerful instrument of structural and investment policy and that it is a source of government revenue. Selection is needed here. But selection that is very subtle, well considered, and calculated from the viewpoint of the social repercussions and from the standpoints of national expediency.

There is among our basic program principles the principle of pragmatism. We are required to be guided strictly by the former in the formulation of decisions and the choice of the tactical measures of their realization. We need to evaluate the situation honestly and dispassionately. In all spheres of our life.

This principle is alien to the government. You will find nothing rational for Mother Russia in the opening of a line of credit for $6 billion. I feel ashamed that our rulers humiliatingly cadged this money. This is, after all, only $40 per capita. Enough for the whole country to go one time to the tavern and drink away its sorrows! Great sorrows—after all, at the demand of this world creditor all the valves have been opened and all limits on the pumping of our resources into others' tanks have been removed.

And they are pumping faster and faster. It has even reached the point of an assault force of Canadian oilmen from Calgary having already been dropped at a number of fields. The Gazprom has a well-known father-patron, who has given his favorite child, at a minimum, $3 billion in privileges alone. The export tariff has risen for everyone, for gas it has been lowered by a factor of 38. On the domestic market the price of gas has increased this year by a factor of almost 16. Domestic machine-building is rotting and has been left without orders, and the oil and gas enterprises purchased in 1994 a total of $5 billion of imported equipment. Privatization, according to a special format, the check auction, without outsiders. Here is your state within a state, here also is the home built for oneself.

We are opposed to such a clan-distributive system. We will strive for a radical break with it. We are for intelligent protectionism in relation to national priorities and the reasonable defense of national commodity producers.

All that would contribute to a strengthening of the sphere of material production and the creation of new technology and increase the competitiveness of our commodities should come under a system of various incentives and privileges, credit and tax and customs included.

But everything needs to be done selectively, on the basis of the highest national priorities. We need to place government support within a strict timeframe and define the conditions for the extension of privileges. Under no circumstances can indolence and dependence be engendered.

But we need to determine these points of growth and announce them and legislatively enshrine the system of support, so that it is not the government bureaucrat, even the highest, who trades privileges.

What is important for us today? What is a priority? Combines, which operate for half the season and are used only as gifts of the president to the kolkhozes he visits? Or watches and cameras, which used to enjoy world popularity, but which were subsequently

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supplanted by brands from Taiwan? Or something new—of the computerized speaking commode type?

We are convinced that task No. 1 is work on securing the country's independence in food. The agrarian sector has been ruined, processing industry has been left without raw material, and food industry is in a state of decay, failing to sustain competition with the giant intervention of overseas products in brightly colored packaging. In Moscow imports constitute 80 percent of retail commodity turnover. But they are not affordable for all. There is an orientation toward the well-to-do and those who are rapidly becoming rich. We have yet to create a middle stratum, and 50 percent of the population is living below the poverty line.

We propose to regulate consumption via taxes. They should be more differentiated. Domestic food products, medication, and basic necessities must become affordable for all. Both tax reform and credit policy need to be oriented toward this, all economic instruments and regulators should be subordinated to this.

In other words, we are for a cardinal change in the vector of the reforms. It may be formulated as follows: It is not particular chosen individuals who should be getting rich at the expense of the majority, but the majority, thanks to the multiplication of the country's wealth.

Russia still has the natural, production, personnel, and intellectual potential sufficient for a strategic maneuver. We are profoundly certain that it is the mobilization of internal resources that could with the pursuit of a judicious state policy change the course of the negative processes and halt the destruction. Such confidence is confirmed by our own historical experience. After all, just 10 years ago not only was a higher living standard than now secured for the vast majority of society and the main social safeguards of the state were implemented in the USSR, in a super-militarized economy, but basic science was developed, the groundwork of new technology was ensured, there was a breakthrough in space, and the geopolitical interests of a great power were realized.

We are convinced that, having intensified state regulation of the reform process, an efficient and competitive economic system, which in the not-too-distant future could interact on a par with the main centers of economic power—a united Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, and continental America—may be formed.

These are attainable goals, but I would like to emphasize particularly that their achievement is possible provided that the economies of Russia and the CIS countries are reintegrated. This question is for us no less important than the inflation percentage is for the present authorities. The politicians simply cannot come to any arrangement, but the peoples have already understood that our strength lies in partnership. And no one should be driven back into a union by force. There are for this political and economic methods of a solution—there would be mutual interests and requirements. So let us seek a way out of the current situation.

We should not be aspiring to the world economy with underdeveloped dystrophy-sufferer status. It is necessary first to reconstitute the single economic space and regain our past might—this is what is important. It is important, once again, from the viewpoint of man. From the standpoints of the 25 million Russians abandoned outside of Russia to the whim of fate by the current authorities, who are directly to blame for the collapse of the Union. From the standpoints of all those who are forced to fill out a visa application in order to see their relatives in a formerly fraternal republic, those who are now so humiliatingly searched at the customs in the capital-city airports of these same former Union republics.

Of what kind of democratic gains and human liberties and rights can we speak when at every step we encounter glaring instances of the abasement of man's honor and dignity? Subtle methods of humiliation have turned honest labor into a symbol of indigence and social vegetation. These same methods have created an atmosphere of universal fear of God's gift of life—both one's own and that of one's children. A fear of losing one's job, taking ill, going hungry, and dying without burial has been engendered. In order to humiliate us, our originality and spirituality are being driven out of us. Foreign homilies, cheap shows, and importunate commercials have supplanted on television all native culture and national art. This is all dreadful.

True reform must raise man from his knees and elevate him. This is why we advocate the human dimension of the reforms.

In real life the success of economic policy is evaluated by entirely specific economic criteria—the total family income, minimum guaranteed pensions and social allowances, the maximum permissible level of unemployment, the dynamics of the development of production, the affordability of goods and services, and so forth.

What ideology or religion are employed here, what scholarly and pseudo-scholarly terms are employed here—this is of no significance. The main thing is that the ordinary people, our compatriots, believe in the possibility of changes for the better, believe in the future and in a Great Russia and its might.

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Much has to be done for this, but time is inexorable, it is calling on us to act more vigorously, more decisively, and on a larger scale.

We are absolutely convinced that for a fundamentally qualitative change in economic policy and the situation in the country a change of power is essential. This change should occur not only and not so much at the level of personalities as by way of the accession to power of other social and political forces. A reorganization of the system of power itself is needed also. A constitutional reorganization, naturally.

The current upper stratum of power was formed under the conditions of the criminalization of all spheres of life and is inseparable from the environment of its conception. It does not contain within it a fundamentally new motivation of activity and, aside from the poverty-stricken "get rich" and "the market will put everything right" slogans, is incapable of perceiving other ideas and ideals. At the constructive level it is simply impotent. It has completely lost its connection with the people and, most important, is afraid of them. It is psychologically and morally deficient since it is aware of the insufficient legitimacy of its power and the unlawfulness of its methods of activity. It has a vital interest in the preservation of the existing order of things since it recognizes that the hour of retribution could come.

It is for this reason that the present Russian authorities are so strongly oriented toward external sources of support in the shape of the governments of the Seven and international economic organizations. For the sake of the appearance of recognition by the world community they are prepared to accept all humiliations and to dutifully follow the lead of the policy of the most influential countries.

It is for this reason that the powers that be are making clumsy attempts to secure for themselves some political front of support. They are doing this by outmoded directive methods. And it is strange that they are simply ignoring the lessons of the past. There is, for example, a fountain of correct words like stability, democracy, patriotism, and there is an unconcealed intention to continue the old course. It can be seen sufficiently clearly from the government program for 1995-1997, secretly adopted in the best Soviet traditions at its own "party and economic activists' meeting," that there can be no question even of any change of economic policy. This is confirmed by the program of the power party also.

It is all this that brought us to create the My Fatherland association. It is all this that is compelling us to mobilize our forces.

We have satisfied ourselves that on account of the fragmented nature and lack of coordination of the actions, the attempts of the opposition forces to rectify the situation have been unsuccessful and cannot influence the course of reforms set by the authorities.

We believe, therefore, that the time has come to create a broad popular movement for a strengthening of the Russian federative state and order and legality. A movement whose highest purpose is the formation of a civil society based on the rule of law and which is capable of ensuring social partnership and the people's well-being and stability and peace in the country.

Our political association proceeds from the need for the consolidation of all citizens and political currents understanding the ruinousness and hopelessness of direct confrontation and the futility of attempts to emerge from the crisis alone. We are prepared for unity with those who firmly cleave to positions of civic duty and responsibility and whose activity is in practice subordinated to concern for the present and future generations of Russia.

Working in unity, we would promote a new generation of politicians not bound by ties of material dependence on the persons and structures that have formed the backbone of the present regime.

The new Russian leaders must understand that the reserve of possible errors is exhausted. Enrichment thanks to the possession of power and political self-admiration are worse than a crime. It is not simply a feeling of responsibility to the people that is essential today. A readiness for self-sacrifice and for everyday routine work is essential in order to do what is necessary for millions of people now, not in the distant future.

Only such a moral climate of selfless devotion in the leadership of the country would make corruption unnatural and would in itself lead to those who wish to make good at others' expense being cut off from power.

We have a goal, we have an understanding of the tasks, we have splendid people capable of tackling them. We are joining the election campaign and will fight for victory for we cannot reconcile ourselves to what is happening in the country. And to our great joy there are among us many who understand well that power is needed not for power's sake but in order to be able to serve the country, serve the fatherland! To serve selflessly and devotedly.

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***Duma Deputy Chairman on Moving Capital From Moscow**

954Q0216A Moscow PRAVDA-5 in Russian
2-9 Jun 95 No 3, p 2

[Commentary by Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Aleksandr Vengerovskiy: "No! I Am Not Satisfied With Moscow..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, perhaps, you will not surprise anyone with the idea of moving the capital. It only accentuates the extraordinary nature of the political moment in which we are living today and corresponds to the general desired irregularity and extraordinariness of decisions.

Three aspects make the problem particularly urgent:

1) the need to preserve the integrity of the state;

2) the reforming of the system and administrative apparatus, including the replacement of the old administrative elite;

3) the ethnological aspect (the return of the condition of being a state subject to the core Russian nation.

If one follows the experience of history, then the new capital should be sought in a remote area, in the center of Russia and possibly not even in the center of its European part.

This year is the 10th anniversary of "perestroyka" and the "new thinking." But with the exception of those who have physically departed from life, we see the same people and their proteges in the key directions of our politics and at the helm of the government. They are dealing not so much with the problem of the achievement of real changes in the life of our society as with attempts to hide themselves in new political trends and to maintain themselves as best they can on the top rung of the social ladder.

It seems that at the present time there is only one possibility of changing all of these traditions from the time of stagnation—to move the capital from Moscow. Certainly the decision is not an easy one on account of the financial possibilities and the historical value of Moscow for the Russian individual. For in all of the wars that came to our Fatherland, it was precisely Moscow that for the Russians became the symbol of the Motherland for which they fought and stood to the death.

Still, the last years of the Brezhnev Politburo and especially the decade of perestroyka added so many negative features to the psychological perception of Moscow here and abroad that hints at a possible move of the capital are taken quite seriously. Moscow first became the bearer and breeding ground of stagnation and then the symbol of defeat in the "cold war" with the West and of the betrayal of Russian national interests within the USSR.

In the present situation in which all of the former republics have withdrawn and become independent states, the logical question is this: Must Russia, which has essentially become a multinational state, continue to be administered by the all-union capital and by all-union international cadres that Russia inherited from the USSR, cadres selected not under the principle of professionalism but for national and party-clan reasons?

It is obvious that once again in Russian history the question of the choice of the Russian capital—a city capable of performing the difficult mission of consolidating the Russian nation and of accomplishing the objective of "gathering Russian land and of defending its independence" has become pressing. Considering the fact that after 1917 Russia did not have its own capital, it must be a matter not even of its being moved but precisely of its reestablishment or establishment.

It is quite obvious that a city that has diminished the national dignity of the Russians cannot pretend to the title of capital of Russia and of the Russian people. Nor is it likely that today this place can be occupied by St. Petersburg, being located in the far northwest and surrounded by hostile states.

Clearly the middle of Russia is again necessary for the purposes of consolidating the nation and restoring the state. And here there are several versions that in our view are most appropriate.

In the first place, there is Nizniy Novgorod, which has already saved Moscow through its defense forces headed by Minin and Pozharskiy. So its candidacy is very worthy at least for the restoration of our national dignity. It has a glorious history and rich industrial traditions (the showcase of Russian industry in prerevolutionary Russia, is a symbol of Russia with the Volga river, and, again, is the center of the European part of Russia.

Secondly, there is Novosibirsk, the geographic center of Russia. And although the history of the city may not be as rich in terms of deeds on behalf of Russia, the time is coming precisely now when, taking into account the totality of internal and external factors, it is worth entrusting a momentous historic mission to a new city that has recently celebrated its 100th anniversary. After all, the city has already gone into world history as a major center of contemporary science. It is the center of political life in the Siberian region.

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It must be said that the question of moving the capital of Russia from Moscow to another city in the country was repeatedly discussed long before the "revolution" of 1991. At the present time, it is difficult to recreate precisely the motivation for such a decision but it may be assumed that it was based on the desire to gratify the Russian Federation with a capital of its own.

Of course the process of moving the capital is very complex. It is necessary to consider many factors here: the sudden change in the consciousness of the people, the inevitable mass migration of the population, problems with the fundamental restructuring of the transportation and information infrastructure, the tremendous political and economic shake-up of the country and of the entire environment, etc.

***Sergey Kovalev on Human Rights Activities**

954F2448A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 31 May 95 No 22, p 11

[Roundtable interview with Sergey Adamovich Kovalev by members of the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA staff, under the "Club 206" rubric; in Moscow; date not given: "Vote for Those Who Do Not Lie. Today's Guest of Our Club 206 Is Sergey Adamovich Kovalev"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

The Journalist's Freedom To Criticize the Authorities; the Bureaucrat's Freedom To Take Bribes.... Yu. Kulikov, deputy editor in chief of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. The first question, of course, is about Chechnya. The authorities are being pressured by the press, television, soldiers' mothers, and you and your friends. Attitudes in the West toward the Chechen war are well known. But the authorities are hardly reacting at all to all of this. Why? Are they no longer afraid of anybody? Are there some other motives, which are not known to us? And, generally speaking, what is happening today in the mutual relations between society and the authorities?

[Kovalev] It would be good to know what is happening. Society, I think, knows this. But do the authorities know? It seems to me that this is what is happening. The country has become more free. And when it becomes more free, everything becomes more free. You think less cautiously about an act that you are planning to commit, whether it is good or bad. If critical utterances against the authorities have become freer, then, to just as great an extent, so has the bureaucrat's taking of bribes. When in democratic, civilized countries, a report appears that such-and-such a minister is making illegal use of an official car, you know what follows. Whereas here, when they write that the chairman of the State Duma arranged for a special trip to transport a dacha table, I think that Ivan Petrovich Rybkin just makes a wry face. What will happen next? Nothing. Just who has not been written about! **L. Grafova, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA observer.** What is happening with your rights commission under the President's Office? Is it being cut back, or are they starting to break it up altogether? Is the problem of refugee migrants being completely thrown out of its field of activity?

[Kovalev] This is the situation. Formally, the commission is not supposed to be subject to reduction. But at one time the so-called office of the Human Rights Commissioner was created within the framework of the president's administration. A kind of embryonic future service. Several people from the commission's office transferred there. Now, however, as we know, there is no commissioner, and it is not known when there will be one. What is it going to exist for, that office, anyway? It is not needed. So it was reduced. It was permitted to return some of the people to our commission. But in the new structure, there turned out to be one deputy chairman fewer. And that group that deals with refugee affairs ceased to exist.

"And Where Were You Before?" A. Sabov, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA observer. My attitude toward you and the struggle that you are leading is one of great sympathy. Nonetheless, I would like to ask you a somewhat uncomfortable question. Your voice rang out very strongly at the end of 1994, when Chechnya began. But before that, there was October of 1993. Why did you then keep silent, why did you not give your assessments?

[Kovalev] What assessments? Even now I think that the actions of the president's administration of 3 and 4 October 1993 were perhaps not the most successful, but they were necessary, forced. They were dictated by extreme circumstances, extreme danger, the threat of civil war. As far as their legal appraisal, this is my reasoning: The law knows cases in which it is necessary to some extent to violate the law. The general norm operating here sounds something like this: A person is not liable if, although he has in fact broken the law, he has by his actions averted the violation of another law, which would have entailed much more dangerous consequences. A well-known example: Someone has his finger on the nuclear button and is ready to push it. You have only one chance to stop the catastrophe—shoot that person and kill him. Yes, you have committed murder, but you will not be held criminally liable. Just as in other cases of so-called essential self-defense. Is it necessary to describe in detail the situation that had taken shape?

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The angry crowd pushing toward the White House, the mayoralty, and Ostankino. Shots, cries of "Kill them!" This has already been spoken of many times. It is another matter that it was indispensable subsequently to have investigated very thoroughly the events of 3 and 4 October 1993, to have checked them. For example, I am not at all convinced that there were really 147 corpses. I do not know how many of them were in the White House. The official information is silent. I am not now talking about the character of the actions of those armed detachments which, waking up, suppressed the armed insurrection. Another question arises as well: Do the events of 1993 have any kind of connection with what followed later in the North Caucasus? I think that yes, they do have a connection. They should not have, but, alas, they do. It seems to me that after the October events, the president came to believe that he was a man for critical situations. That he had a special gift, a special intuition in just such circumstances to make harsh and correct decisions, which would then lead to wonderful results, to the rapid resolution of acute crises. That famous secret edict on Chechnya is just such a decision. And, of course, the precedent of the violation of the Constitution that had once been committed also had significance. I am not at all convinced that all of the presidential host asked themselves this question: In what exceptional cases is the right granted to depart from the law, and in which cases is it not? And what then will be the consequences? Their reasoning was very simple: I myself write the Constitution and I myself violate it as well.

[Kulikov] You are blamed for almost not having noticed the human rights abuses by the Dudayev regime, whereas you speak out at top volume about the atrocities committed by the federal troops. I understand that the crimes of Dudayev's people and the crimes of the military are different things. But nevertheless, how would you respond to such a rebuke?

[Kovalev] First of all, that is not completely correct, that we did not notice. At the end of the summer of 1994, we were in the North Caucasus, and we heard various complaints. I was even asked to travel from Moscow to Groznyy and meet with Dudayev. But then they suddenly called and said: No, we talked things over, and it is not necessary to do this temporarily. Yes, it is true that today they write and say: Look at him, the human rights defender—he screams about the war with all his might, but before that.... Well, what about before that? What kind of complaints did we hear there in the Caucasus? Someone was robbed, someone, raped—that is, purely criminal things. And I am trying now to explain to everyone: If a hooligan has mistreated you in the street, this is not the business of the human rights activists. He did not violate your human rights; he violated the Criminal Code. That is what the police and the procuracy are for. The question of human rights always amounts to the violation of these rights by the authorities. True, here there is the aspect of where, exactly, the authorities were looking. Why is the procuracy idle, and why do the police not carry out their duties? This already has a bearing on the rights of the individual. The authorities are not carrying out their duty. But then another question arises: And what kind of authorities are they? Was Chechnya, for the three years before the war, from 1991 to 1994, a part of Russia, or was it not? In what capacity should we have spoken there? And would we not have heard in reply, "Just clear out to your Russia—fast"? It is clear that the problem was purely political. And how could I then have raised it there, if the authorities of the Russian Federation were not dealing with the question of the status of Chechnya, and were not conducting the necessary negotiations? So you decide to whom the accusation of inaction should really be addressed—to the human rights activists or to the federal authorities.

One Thing Remains—To Scream! O. Moroz, member of the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editorial board. Special units are operating in Chechnya according to the "sentry method"—the Spetsnaz, the OMON [special-purpose militia detachments]. They pillage, murder, commit atrocities there. And then they return to their places. Does it not seem to you that in this way some kind of massive body of forces were being trained, which would then be used for a completely different purpose within Russia?

[Kovalev] You are asking whether some authorities have the deliberate intention of building their own—as they express it—contingent through such practice. Who could answer you with assurance that yes, this is the case? Probably, someone does. But who is this "someone?" The president or the minister? About the president I cannot say anything, while the minister, generally speaking, would want to have experienced fighters, and not green recruits. But I want to make a remark that is very important, from my standpoint. Yes, animosity is growing in the Army. This is a natural thing in any war. In December of last year, our group did not meet a single person who would say: They have a mess here, and I have come to establish order. Everyone said something completely different: What are you deputies doing here? Better you should go back to Moscow and get us pulled out of here. Today one no longer hears these conversations. And we come up against embittered people very often. But despite this, if you talk with the local population about the

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outrages that are committed, you will hear: No it is not the soldiers. It is rare that someone will declare that the soldiers are pillaging. As a rule, these are completely different people, even of a different age; they are easy to distinguish. These are special-purpose units. Exploratory teams, so to speak. These people are 25-30 years old. As a rule, they are well developed physically. Many of them wear beards. Some work in masks and helmets. Samashki, for example, was purged by people most of whom wore black scarves on their heads. I saw them at their posts, and even spoke with one of them. This man asked me right away whether I were not a Jew.... **O. Chaykovskaya, writer.** An unusual phenomenon has occurred, your opposition to what is happening. I am interested in everything that is connected with this, and I am interested in the degree of danger to which you are subjected.

[Kovalev] It is difficult for me to talk about this, because my principle is to do everything openly. To speak about this at meetings, at press conferences. Of course, I would gladly have engaged, on the contrary, in "quiet diplomacy." I would have gone to Boris Nikolayevich and said, "Boris Nikolayevich, children are being murdered. Stop it, and I give you my word that I will be silent about it all. Just save the people, and with them, God help you, your own reputation." But what were they going to say? They know everything. And they decided to do this. What then remains for us to do? To scream! And that is what we are trying to do. Both here and when I meet with various Western leaders. **A. Borin, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA observer.** Was your conversation with Clinton a long one?

[Kovalev] It was an official meeting with Gore. It lasted about 45 minutes. Clinton was present at it for approximately 15 minutes. Although he himself said nothing about Chechnya, I think that he understands everything. That was evident from his questions.... I should note that recently I have been somewhat grieved by the attitude of the mass media toward the Chechen issue. Do you remember the television report that the Chechens were supposedly shooting their own elders? Then there was a press conference. Shabad, who had arrived from Samashki, spoke. And I said that I would not say anything about Samashki, that I would speak about something else, which seems to me just as terrible as Samashki—I would speak about our press. And I asked whether there was a representative of NTV there. "There is," said a man with a camera. And right there I began to speak into his camera about that same report on the shooting of the elders and about the fact that it had never been refuted. After all, how should the journalist have acted? He should, on the very next day, have said: "I am sorry, this was an unintentional lie. It is terrible that government sources lie like that, that they try to justify themselves in this way for the outrages in Samashki." And what came of that press conference? I made a point of watching the television broadcast. There sits Kovalev. Shabad says something, the commentator makes some comment. And Kovalev just sits there and says nothing. And you cannot tell what he is doing there. Who is imposing on television this tendentious line of behavior? I do not know, I would not undertake to explain. But that same NTV did a great deal for the dissemination of the truth about Chechnya. I am exceedingly grateful to it for that, as I am to other courageous journalists. How will events in Chechnya unfold further? There are, it seems to me, two variants. One is optimistic, but, alas, also fantastic. Negotiations. If they were conducted by reasonable people under the relentless pressure of the public, then everything could end fairly quickly. However, the chances for such a variant are feebly being lost. After all, at the end of December, this would have been very easy to achieve. And in a way very honorable for Russia, where Chechnya would remain within its structure. Now this is more and more difficult to do. The other side of the prognosis—not even Ireland, but Afghanistan for several years. A much more realistic variant, it seems to me.

What Can We Do? D. Molchanov, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA department editor. I want to understand the motives for your party affiliation. You have the image of an honest man. What connects you with Russia's Choice?

[Kovalev] I was on the lists of Russia's Choice, was one of the founders of the pre-election bloc. I am dissatisfied with a very great deal here. If only the fact that, considered without any cause to be the government's party, Russia's Choice has become overgrown with an enormous number of representatives of the nomenklatura, with people who are in no way liberal and who are in no way democrats. But the program and all the basic documents of this faction, and its ideology, are liberal. And Gaydar is a liberal. He and I are of the same mind. If serious ideological contradictions with the faction arose in me, I would have spoken about them. But there are none. So what would the grounds be to walk away from them? **L. Velikanova, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA department editor.** As an old, inveterate democrat and liberal, who went to rallies and struggled so that these authorities should come to power, I realize that today there is no faith in these authorities. But soon, possibly, elections will be held. There is still an opportunity to think about who will come to power. Whom are we to vote for?

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[Kovalev] For whomever you like. I cannot answer your question.

[Velikanova] You understand that I will not go vote for Zhirinovskiy. It ends up that people will not bother to vote at all.

[Kovalev] That is what would be terrible.... **I. Rishina, department editor.** What depends on us, anyway? We, people who are supporting our democratic movement, suffering for it, doing, pardon me, our bit, whatever that might be; what can we do today?

[Kovalev] Just do not think that I was offended for the democrats. Nothing of the sort. The situation really is a complicated one. And you are right in many ways. As the democrats are, so also is the democracy. Three-quarters of those who call themselves democrats, repeating democratic slogans, always voting as the democrats do, are essentially people who do fine in any circumstances. They did perfectly well during the years of stagnation, and they are doing well now. These people placed their bets in their game. All that is right. And all that is, alas, natural and inevitable. But I want to tell you something else. Let us look back. Let us remember the miracle that took place with our participation, before our eyes. We say what we want to today. Whatever we are thinking, that is what we say. We also read what we want to, incidentally. And that, believe me, is no small thing, by any means. And all of this was not granted to us by someone. Gorbachev did not want that at all. I know what they wanted. They wanted to patch the system up, to darn it. And no more than that. I read a denunciation of my own self, and not only of myself, signed by the fathers of perestroyka. Colleagues Shevardnadze and Kryuchkov and Procurator General Rekunkov appealed to the Politburo. They appealed twice. True, they recommended not to arrest us, because that would cause a big scandal, but—to denounce us. So it was not by their hands that the miracle was worked. But by my hands and yours. Why do I say miracle? Because after their 70-year rule, it would have been easier to expect a situation that is much, a hundred times, worse than today. The freedom of opinions that we have today is a guarantor, a condition, for other freedoms as well. You ask what you and I can do? I will tell you. There is a generally known set of political figures. Can we judge who of them is a decent person, who will not lie to us? Yes, we can. So vote for those who do not lie. And do not vote for those who do lie.

[Borin] All this is true. But what happens with these decent people? In what kind of political situation will the elections be held, if they are held at all?

[Kovalev] Yes, that is true. But it is people's behavior in this situation that will allow us to judge who is who. It seems to me that we find ourselves today before a catastrophe: The slogan "The Fatherland is in danger" is completely appropriate. The discord that is tearing apart the democratic camp is simply terrible. I would call it a collective apostasy, a collective betrayal. One must not have a head in order to have things out while standing at the edge of a precipice. Recently A. Minikin, from MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS, also contributed his bit. I will not undertake to explain anything to him. One can polemicize with arguments, but to dispute streams of filth is an empty business! I would like to call upon society to bring the very strongest pressure to bear on politicians, to call upon the democratic forces to unite, despite all of their differences. For this, of course, reasonableness and courage are needed, but otherwise, many voters really will not come vote. It is hardly necessary to explain whose hands that would play into. And where the new Duma would lead us when the democrats composed a clear minority. **O. Blotskiy, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA department editor.** You are often and widely compared with Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov. Who do you feel yourself to be?

[Kovalev] What kind of a Sakharov am I? I feel myself to be Kovalev. I have my passport; I can show you.

Media Issues

*Report on Fourth Congress of Russian Journalists' Union

954F2466A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian 4-10 May 95 No 18, p 12

[Article by Anna Mazepa: "When Everyone Speaks Correctly..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Fourth Congress of the Russian Journalists' Union was held in Moscow. Money that the union could not afford was spent, and immense preparatory work was done. It is harder to talk about the results—there turned out to be none—but could there have been?

The speeches in the Kremlin's Marble Hall during those two days made a strange impression. They flowed perfectly freely and fully in the spirit of our times, but absolutely in isolation, into a strange vacuum, into the deafness of a 1995-model corporation. It was as though everyone was talking about his own understanding of the profession, but those opinions stubbornly refused to merge.

Anatoliy Lysenko, a person very respected in the profession, reported: "Since 1985 no new stars of television

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journalism have been born in our country. There is one star—a journalist by the name of 'DOLLAR.' There are no journalists who arrive with new ideas because they arrive with new sponsors. The young people are losing the high ideals that Soviet journalism had, and therefore they are losing their future as well." He is right. No stars have been born, and creative happiness does not lie in money, but money does mean something, all the same, especially today.

Mikhail Poltoranin, the present chairman of the State Duma Committee on Information Policy and Communications and formerly a journalist, totally bowled the audience over. For starters he said that Vice Premier Shakhray had "recently dropped down from the moon" and was therefore surprised that the mass media still existed in Russia. For your information, Mr. Shakhray is in fact the vice premier who has been in charge in the government of dealing with the problems of the country's press. Sergey Mikhaylovich hardly need take offense though because Mikhail Nikiforovich went on to ask questions in such a point-black manner that it made your skin crawl.

Is it possible to find out, he asked indignantly, which state is financing the Foundation for the Defense of Glasnost chaired by Aleksey Simonov? Who has that foundation helped financially? In Poltoranin's opinion, that connection is seemingly very important. Suddenly he's talking about spies: the CIA, the FBI, and the Mossad. He demanded that the Journalists' Union conduct that inquiry if it wanted to play a serious role in the life of the corporation. Mr. Poltoranin was right in his hints that "something isn't right": after all, everyone in Moscow has long known that the Foundation for the Defense of Glasnost exists on funds supplied by American charitable foundations. It is also known whom the foundation has helped financially. For example, recently it was the St. Petersburg newspaper NEVSKOYE VREMYA, so that it could help organize one of the search expeditions to Chechnya where its correspondents had turned up missing. The Duma itself could not find any money for that.

However, a congress in the Kremlin is really not the place for arguments. Mr. Poltoranin did not finish his speech to the accompaniment of the corporation's jeers but calmly got down from the rostrum and moved to the presidium. Evidently the fact that he himself had sinned with the Americans during the report period, a fact which he acknowledged to his colleagues, played a role here. He had recently visited the United States and had made a speech to congressmen. He asked them to give money, $150 million, for the "support of the legislative basis of a free press in Russia." So everyone is quits in our country.

Shod Muladzhanov, the editor in chief of MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, was original and truthful. He reported bluntly that "an honest newspaper market has been established in Moscow, with the exception of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, but that newspaper is where it is. Let it stay there." The remaining four minutes of his speech were devoted to a report on his own work. Thanks to him for that.

Vladimir Povolyayev, general director of the television program "The Beacon," complained about the lack of journalistic solidarity. He was struck, for example, by the fact that Asahara was a sensation for Russian journalists, while the possible shutdown in the near future of "The Beacon," without which many generations of inhabitants of this state could not imagine their life, was not a sensation. He said his piece and sat down. He was most likely hoping for something, but everyone listened respectfully and went on to listen to a report of the next tragedy.

It was not long in coming. It was depicted by Vladimir Filippov, chairman of the Russian Association of Advertising Agencies, who reported that advertising agent and journalist were related professions in the sense that their creative work is similar and "profit rates drop if circulation drops." That is probably true so what's the point of arguing here. As we know, the average journalist's earnings in Russia are 100,000 rubles, while the average ad agent's earnings are R4 million. One of them writes like crazy, while the other merely places things. A tragedy.

Although Sergey Filatov, head of the presidential administrative staff, had some unpleasant things to say, he did not produce any uproar either; people swallowed what he had to say: "Mischief making, the mocking of anything and everything, and nihilism are very dangerous in their consequences. Sometimes it seems that the press is deliberately kindling discontent in society and knowingly working for destabilization.

"What represents the greatest danger? Discrediting not only the regime but democracy as well. The 'down with' attitude can possess the mass mind, as happened previously in Iran, which opened the way to the dictatorship of the Shiite clergy. By hammering relentlessly at the force-wielding structures, we are not contributing to the cause of moving the reforms forward. The point is the degree of criticism, its nature, and its purity. Criticism should promote the achievement of effective results." Who would say that he isn't right? Purity is good, and Iran is bad. By the way, Filatov spoke longer than everyone else—about 40 minutes—and he had a harder time than the others.

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Vsevolod Bogdanov, chairman of the Journalists' Union, spent about the same amount of time at the rostrum: "The journalist is obliged to exercise one of the principal human rights: to know the truth. If that person earns 100,000 in wages, he can hardly perform these functions conscientiously. Consequently, our press is becoming less and less disinterested and more and more corrupt." He too, is absolutely right. Poverty is no sin, but destitution corrupts. Granted, not everyone.

A storm did occur after all, however, and it was of human making by Pavel Gutiontov, a prominent capital journalist and now secretary of the Journalists' Union and chairman of the committee for the defense of free speech. He wanted the congress to take a stand on behalf of two staff members of the weekly SOBESEDNIK, who for purposes of advertising had produced a supplement to SOBESEDNIK under the name of MAT, in which items were printed using the so-called non-normative [obscene] lexicon. During this journalistic activity they were actually arrested. Here the congress decided to be principled by proudly rejecting his proposal. "Shame! Defending users of obscenities!" The users of obscenities, however, were released without a statement from the congress, while the delegates, wandering in the foyer between sessions and smoking in the smoking rooms, swore as usual, out of boredom.

That is all; with that, it ended. The authorities, as usual, did not listen to the press, and the journalists did not even listen to each other. In a country where there is no public opinion, and therefore nothing to talk about **together**, the march to democracy continued. As it turned out, the appeals, "Let's live in harmony," in the sincerity of which the organizers of the Fourth Congress quite seriously placed their hopes, penetrated neither hearts nor minds. Evidently, the congress was doomed from the outset, and this became obvious toward the end. When everyone speaks so correctly, you want to hang yourself.

Vsevolod Bogdanov, as the sole nominee, was elected chairman until the next general activity. On this account we are in a quandary, not knowing whether to convey congratulations or condolences. The present course of the Journalists' Union is a road to nowhere, but no one is to blame for that. The old quality has become obsolete, and a new one simply is not being born. Maybe we will be witnesses to the slow expiration of the union, for whose funeral services not all that many people will turn out.

Optimists believe that everything will still work out, and from the present turning point journalists will march into the only quality that is interesting—they will influence public opinion in Russia—and it appears that we are already somewhere quite close. Maybe, except that it is the dreams of optimists that usually cost everyone else so dearly.

*St Petersburg TV Program on ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Discussed

954F2466B Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian 4-10 May 95 No 18, p 12

[Article by Anna Politkovskaya: "It Turns Out That an Information War Is Being Waged in Russia, but Only Its Soldiers Know About It"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The place where these soldiers serve is interesting—at ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, the official government publication. That fact, which is of no small importance, was reported on 29 April on the St. Petersburg channel. For more than two hours that channel carried a broadcast of "An Evening With ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA."

The "Evening" abounded in specific terminology, as though it were a meeting of special forces veterans: "fight," "enemy," "sustain a blow," "betrayal of the Homeland," "divulge a secret directive," and "our cause is just." It was a performance that was unforgettable in every respect for many reasons! First, not one of our country's newspapers—and there are now more than 2,000 of them—had ever before been granted so much time to promote itself on state television channels. Well, maybe only PRAVDA, before.

Second, if you have been given the opportunity to show yourself off to your advantage, then show yourself off, attract attention, and radiate the utmost charm, but for reasons that one can only try to guess, in this case nothing of the sort occurred. In place of a promotion, what happened was a thorough antipromotion, a public stripping of bandages off one's own aging sores.

Some of our readers probably missed the whole thing. Therefore, we have deemed it possible to give them some of the details of the "television spectacular" in the form of the principal characters, intrigues, and quotations. So:

Natalya Polezhayeva, editor in chief of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, said about her paper: "We are the only newspaper in Russia that publishes articles on privatization. We are the only publication that argues with the president's Judicial Chamber on Information Disputes. In 1990 I founded the magazine SOTSIALNAYA ZASHCHITA, and I realized then that what people needed was not a journalist's opinion but documents, directives. Now the circulation of that

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magazine exceeds the circulation of all publications distributed within the boundaries of the Sadovyy Ring. ..."

About the readers she said: "People in Russia are accustomed to reading an official newspaper. They got accustomed to it back when we all resembled one another. When there got to be many different opinions, the official newspaper's position became even more important to people than before so that they could orient themselves amidst the opinions. For all the official stuff that we publish, we, as our readers say, have become the most scandalous newspaper in Russia and try in every issue to publish very controversial articles. ..."

About the Russian press, she said: "Under present conditions the most independent media is the state media. The so-called independent publications today have to depend on commercial entities, so in what way are they independent? There have been attempts to put pressure on us, too, but I put a stop to those attempts. ..."

About her colleagues, she said: "Any newspaper that publishes official documents will increase its circulation. IZVESTIYA used to have that right, but they gave it up. They gave it up for freedom! Here is what they got: circulation dropped and now they regret it a lot; it is distributed only in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and a few other big cities. ... I have the impression that many journalists today are crackpots. For example, there was a piece about us on NTV. Of course, everything was upside-down. The crackpots are terribly remote from the people. Our position encounters an enormous amount of resistance in the other media. The fight, from our viewpoint, exceeds the limits of decency, but so far we are sustaining the blow. Our cause is just."

This whole tale may seem to be simply nonsense or sickness. Indeed, no one in Russia is forbidden from suffering delusions of grandeur, but there is a difference between our personal problems—our own lot of suffering within the confines of our own living space—and the rules of decency that are accepted in society. One must not forget about corporate ethics, which do exist, although no one has ever published them in the form of an official document. Ethics presuppose: when doing your own thing, do it, but respect what your neighbor is doing. If you do not respect it, at least don't slander him and put salt in his tea."

Let us take just one Polezhayeva television passage—the one about privatization. It is common knowledge that the vast majority of publications today write about the vagaries of the privatization that has been carried out. Moreover, there are excellent journalists who speak so brilliantly about the difficult phenomenon of our economy that they have won immense respect among their colleagues, readers, and specialists and have won prestigious journalistic prizes precisely for elucidating the problems of privatization in Russia. No doubt the editor in chief feels hurt that there are no ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondents among those journalists, but what can you do!

Natalya Polezhayeva's hurt feelings are humanly understandable: there hasn't been much glory lately in ROSSIYSKAYA's journalistic circles. Journalists are fleeing the place, and those who don't flee take articles to other editorial offices about what goes on inside of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA and what hounding and psychological persecution journalists who disagree with Mrs. Polezhayeva in the least respect are subjected to. Of course, the editor in chief cannot help but know about this. Consequently, the apotheosis of her appearance on the St. Petersburg program was the following exercise: "We find ourselves the rara avis in a flock of ordinary birds." The "flock of ordinary birds" is all the other Russian media. The "rara avis" is ROSSIYSKAYA. Excuse me, but that is just too much, when delusions of grandeur are combined with a persecution complex. A state civil servant cannot conduct himself that way, and that is precisely what Mrs. Polezhayeva is today. Her manner is different and more fitting for the editor in chief of the newspaper SOKOL ZHIRINOVSKOGO [Zhirinovskiy's Falcon].

A government newspaper, existing on budgetary money, cannot allow itself either such actions or such statements. Here there are only two courses. Either the newspaper takes a good whiff of smelling salts, comes to its senses, and apologizes to those whom it has insulted—and apologizes, by the way, in the same fashion, on the St. Petersburg channel—or Mr. Chernomyrdin finally makes a decision concerning Mrs. Polezhayeva's occupation of the office of editor in chief of an official government publication. Proximity to her is dangerous both for the budget and for one's own career. That way Mr. Chernomyrdin will hardly get the additional votes he counts on as head of a large election bloc.

Nonetheless Natalya Polezhayeva, albeit the main character in the intrigue, was not the only one. Several other members of the collective were also presented at the "Evening."

Vladimir Kucherenko, lead commentator, said: "I am a soldier in the information war. I want to demonstrate that a model of society is taking shape in Moscow that will bring innumerable woes to the country. My book on the mafia, *Moskovskiy Sprut* [Moscow Octopus], is already a bibliographic rarity. Another on the same subject will soon come out. Look for it. The job of our

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defense is the doing of our own hands. Let us work to create a society and act as a united front, with a single fist, with weapons, with uniform. ..."

Vladimir Klimov, deputy editor in chief, said: "Our position on Chechnya sharply differed from the position of the other media; we stood up in defense of state interests and the unity of Russia. Most importantly, we are not afraid of lofty words. ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA is the only newspaper that provided support to our servicemen and helped Chechens find out the news. Until that, the Chechen people had to rely on rumors."

Vladimir Verin, lead commentator, said: "I want to read an official report. Of the 198 journalists who were working in Chechnya at the end of December, only 20 took the side of the Russian troops; the rest wrote from the Dudayev side."

Whose official report? Who wrote it? When? To whom? For the professional journalist, these are the main questions, and until you have the answers to them, you don't rush to make public a controversial document. One is struck by the manner of presenting oneself to society as a counterbalance to all the country's other media, as a defender of state interests! In the final analysis, all the rest of the thousands of Russian journalists are not enemies of themselves and their country, either. Most likely, people on ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA sometimes guess that fact, after all. What sort of model with "innumerable woes" is it that Mr. Kucherenko makes such assertive statements about, with a Nevzorov-like gleam in his eyes? One would like to see facts, and not the ones that Mr. Kucherenko uses in his articles. They contain no references, and there is no way of knowing where they came from. Furthermore, the book *Moskovskiy Sprut* has been lying around for some years now in Moscow piles of unsold books. It is absolutely unnoticeable that anyone has rushed to get hold of it.

When Dmitriy Kholodov, MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS' military correspondent, was killed, a wave of grief and indignation over a terrorist act of unprecedented brazenness swept through all of Russia's newspapers, regardless of their political bent. It could not have been otherwise. Articles on it were carried on front pages. But where else could they have been? That did not reflect the excessive emotion of the corporation; it reflected immeasurable pain. At the time ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA breathed more regularly than any of the rest. More accurately, it breathed absolutely regularly, as though nothing had happened. A notice about the tragedy appeared on the very last page, where advice to housewives, curiosities, psychics, and astrologers are carried. Even that proved insufficient; the notice was accompanied by an inordinately large—according to newspaper canons such a thing serves to intensify the content of the text published alongside of it—photo of an orangutan.

Memory has failed to retain the caption under the photograph, and one did not want to remember. There was one feeling: one's colleagues had totally outdone themselves in throwing aside all restraint and all discipline, in lies and in cynicism. Enough of your monkeys, enough of your "soldiers in the information war," enough of your unprofessionalism at state expense. ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA is the only publication that, together with media for the blind, received a state subsidy. ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA is part of the regime. Does that mean that this is what state information policy is about? Excuse me, but it is impossible to agree with that.

Military & Space Issues

Rocket Design Bureau Chief on Conversion

954Q0212A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 8 Jun 95 p 4

[Article by Vladimir Radchuk, khimavtomatiki KB [Design Bureau] chief designer and doctor of technical sciences, under the rubric: "Conversion": "We Will Reach Outer Space"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our country's leading position in the rocket-space sector, whose achievements are recognized throughout the world, was earned over the course of more than 50 years through the efforts of several generations of the best engineers and highly skilled workers.

The Russian Space Agency Enterprise Khimavtomatiki Design Bureau (KBKhA) is one of a few design bureaus that is involved with the development of highly-efficient, liquid-propellant rocket engines for military and space launch vehicles.

Third stage engines for the Vostok, Voskhod, and Soyuz space launch vehicles and highly economical second and third stage engines for the Proton launch vehicle were developed at the enterprise.

The uniqueness and technical efficiency of the engines that have been developed have ensured their long-life — they have been supporting launches of manned spacecraft, satellites and orbital stations for over 30 years.

Development of the RD-0120 liquid oxygen-liquid hydrogen engine with a thrust of 200 tonnes for the Energiya-Buran reusable system is one of KBKhA's most significant developments. Its development required

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the solution of a number of scientific problems, the development of new materials and technologies, and the construction of specialized production and a unique test facility.

Development of the only nuclear rocket engine in Russia was accomplished at KBKhA. In the 1980's, a series of full-scale tests were conducted at Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Range that confirmed the efficiency of its components. This engine can be employed for outer space and interplanetary flights. Development of new rocket engines for space continues, although at a substantially reduced level.

A new engine is being developed for the Proton launch vehicle to resolve ecological safety issues and engines are being modernized for the Soyuz launch vehicle and for the Energiya-M launch vehicle.

Since 1985, a substantial reduction of the scope of the state order for the primary theme and an increase of the volumes of work along conversion directions of activity has begun at KBKhA.

While considering market requirements, KBKhA's conversion program provides for the conduct of work for the development and series production of oil and gas equipment, chemical pumps, ozone water purification equipment, agroindustrial equipment, pneumatic starters for motor vehicles, future hydrogen fuel engines, and color separation templates for new generation television picture tubes.

KBKhA's experience in the control of processes associated with combustion stability and hydraulics stability was widely utilized during the development of equipment for the oil and gas industry and technologies were employed to protect metals from hydrogen sulfide and other corrosive mediums.

As a result, the ShGIYu-5 assembly for the intensification of the extraction of oil from wells through thermal impact on oil formations was developed in a very short period of time. The ShGIYu-5 has a capacity of up to 10 tonnes of steam-gas per hour. At the present time, a mobile monopropellant system is being developed based upon the ShGIYu-5 that does not have any equals in the world. The system can be delivered to the well on two KamAZ trucks and it is ready for use in one and a half hours.

Equipment for the hydraulic fracturing of oil formations by pumping special mixtures under high pressure into a well will permit increased extraction of oil and the restoration of suspended wells. The equipment was developed by KBKhA jointly with a Russian defense industry concern for special metallurgy and machine building.

The equipment also permits the conduct of acid treatment of wells which expands the range of its application with regard to similar equipment of Western firms that is being purchased at the present time at a price of approximately $7 million.

Powerful compressors (with a pressure of 40 MP [megapascale's] and a capacity of 25 nm^3 [normal cubic meters] per minute), that are being purchased abroad at the present time, are required for the operation of steam-gas equipment at oil fields. We selected a new free-piston diesel compressor design during the development of a domestically-produced compressor with similar parameters. This promising machine weighs three times less and has a substantially lower level of vibration which permits it to be utilized in a mobile variant.

New KBKhA-developed nozzles for gas-compressor units are being introduced at Severgazprom Enterprise. This permits us to reduce fuel consumption by 10-15 percent and to reduce harmful discharges into the atmosphere.

The development and manufacture of pumping units for the oil and metallurgical industries are a promising direction of the enterprise's activity. Their introduction will permit us to completely reject the importation of similar foreign equipment.

As of today, enormous experience on the development of high-rpm pumps has been accumulated in rocket manufacturing. Gamma pumps that were developed with the application of these achievements have substantially less weight and improved performance.

Right now the enterprise is manufacturing pumps with a capacity of from eight to 700 m^3 per hour for pumping sulfuric and hydrochloric acids, hot petroleum products and other corrosive substances. KBKhA's chemical pumps have proven themselves at Novolipetsk and Norilsk metallurgical combines. The output of pumps at KBKhA has a stable trend toward growth and planned production volumes total 500 units in 1995 with a potential for up to 2,000 units per year.

A sufficiently powerful reserve was created at KBKhA for the development of equipment for meat processing (meat trimmers-mincers, cutters, minced extruders, mini-sausage shops), milk processing (lines for the production of concentrated milk, sour cream, and casein), the production of sugar (diffusers, centrifuges, beet pulp presses, and others). The listed equipment is being successfully operated at many Russian enterprises.

Nevertheless, a trend toward the increase of production volumes is not being traced in the production of agroindustrial equipment. Its high technical level and quality, that hardly lags behind similar Western equipment, are

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coming up against the market's low purchasing power and the absence of investments for the development of processing equipment.

We are aggressively working with our administration, Voronezh Oblast and the Central Chernozem Region. The administration is organizing financing of work for the development of equipment for the sugar industry based upon the shared participation of Central Chernozem Region's sugar plants.

A similar situation is taking shape for ozone equipment. In Russia for the time being it is more advantageous to employ poisonous chlorine compounds to purify water and no one cleans industrial wastes. The wide introduction of developed gamma equipment for the production of ozone (with a capacity of from 50 grams to five kilograms per hour) would permit us to solve many of the cities' economic problems.

If the developers of oil and gas equipment, chemical pumps, ozone equipment and partially agroindustrial equipment at one time "managed", using internal sources of financing and small budget resources allocated by the ministry, to break away from zero and put something into production, an even harder share was obtained by the remaining promising directions of conversion.

Only 526 million rubles of conversion credits of the R33 billion (in 1994 prices) required by KBKhA for conversion was allocated and it has been practically rejected for financing in the future. The Russian Space Agency also does not have the resources for the conversion of subdepartmental enterprises or for the conduct of scientific research work along civilian lines.

Real, well-thought out conversion is needed for an enterprise taken individually on the scale of Russia. There should be minimal but precisely defined state regulation of conversion processes in order to increase the production volumes of goods and the quality of industrial production, to protect our domestic market from Eastern and Western competitors, and to compete the quality of goods on the external market.

Today it is already not so important whose idea, whose money or whose property it will be — state, private, stock, or maybe even partially foreign. The main thing is to create modern profitable production in free production areas in the center of the Chernozem area.

Regional Affairs

*Sverdlovsk Oblast's Gubernatorial Elections

*Presidential Edict

954F2549A Yekaterinburg OBLASTNAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 95 p 1

[Presidential edict: "Edict of the President of the Russian Federation on the Gubernatorial Elections in Sverdlovsk Oblast"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with the address of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Duma on the holding of gubernatorial elections in Sverdlovsk Oblast, taking into consideration the existence of the necessary legal basis for the holding of the elections, and being guided by Part 1 of Article 77 and Part 2 of Article 80 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, I decree:

1. Permit as an exception the holding of gubernatorial elections in Sverdlovsk Oblast.

2. The bodies of state authority of Sverdlovsk Oblast [should] provide for the carrying out of organizational and technical measures in the preparation of gubernatorial elections in Sverdlovsk Oblast within the time set by federal and oblast legislation.

3. The present decree goes into effect on the day of its publication.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation

Moscow, the Kremlin
14 May 1995

*Ruling on Regional Electoral Commission

954F2549B Yekaterinburg OBLASTNAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 95 p 1

[Ruling by the Regional Electoral Commission of Sverdlovsk Oblast: "Ruling from 12 May 1995 of the City of Yekaterinburg on the Actions of the Regional Electoral Commission of Sverdlovsk Oblast in Connection with Decree No 479 of the President of the Russian Federation 'On Gubernatorial Elections in Sverdlovsk Oblast' from 11 May 95"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

1. In connection with the impossibility of guaranteeing the electoral rights of citizens set forth in articles 8, 10, and 19 of the federal law "On the Basic Guarantees of the Electoral Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation," articles 8, 10, 11, 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 of the oblast law "On Gubernatorial Elections of Sverdlovsk Oblast," and articles 6, 7, 8, 13, and

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14 of the oblast law "On the Elections of Bodies of Local Self-Government in Sverdlovsk Oblast" in the event of the holding of elections on 18 June, 11995, recommend to the Sverdlovsk Oblast Duma that it set a date for the holding of elections for the election of Sverdlovsk Oblast and the heads of local self-government guaranteeing the observance of the time established by federal and oblast laws for the performance of organizational and technical measures in the preparation of the above-named elections and the realization of the guarantees of the electoral rights of the citizens.

2. Publish the present ruling in OBLASTNAYA GAZETA and send it to the mass media.

[Signed] Commission chairman M. Kukushkin [Signed] Commission secretary N. Chistyakova

*Resolution Defines Dates of Actions

954F2549C Yekaterinburg OBLASTNAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 95 p 1

[Decree from Sverdlovsk Oblast Duma, Yekaterinburg: "Decree No 204 from 17 May 1995 on the Making of Changes to Point 1 and Point 2 of Decree No 151 of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Duma from 4 March 1995 "On the Elections of the Bodies of Local Self-Government and Governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with the address of the regional electoral commission on the impossibility of guaranteeing the electoral rights of citizens in the holding of the elections for the governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast and heads of local self-government set in accordance with Decree No 151 of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Duma from 4 March 1995 "On the Elections of Bodies of Local Self-Government and Governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast" and on the basis of Edict No 479 of the president of the Russian Federation from 11 May 1995, the Sverdlovsk Oblast Duma decrees:

1. Make changes to Point 1 and Point 2 of the decree of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Duma from 4 March 1995 "On the Elections of Bodies of Local Self-Government and Governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast" with the substitution of 6 August 1995 in place of 18 June 1995 as the date of elections.

2. The present decree goes into effect on the day of its publication.

[Signed] E. Rossel, chairman of the oblast Duma

*Oblast Duma Session Comments

954F2549D Yekaterinburg OBLASTNAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 May 95 p 1

[Commentary by Stanislav Solomatov: "Elections Set for 6 August"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is over. We will vote. It is still not entirely clear for whom. But we will vote.

At its 17th meeting that began on 17 May, the oblast Duma decreed that elections for the governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast and heads of local self-government would be held on 6 August of this year.

So why is it not entirely clear?

The fact is that the Duma executed its decision through changes in its decree from 4 March of this year on the holding of the mentioned dual elections. But the effect of this decree can still be suspended within a maximum of 10 days while the oblast court examines the claim of the oblast administration that the setting of the elections of heads of local self-government should be found not in accordance with legislation.

Thus, if the situation with respect to the elections of heads of local self-government remains unclear until the session of the oblast court, then obviously the gubernatorial election will be held at the time set by the Duma. This became possible after the edict of the president of Russia on the setting—as an exception—of the gubernatorial election in Sverdlovsk Oblast only went into effect on 17 May, the day of its publication in OBLASTNAYA GAZETA.

The biggest part of the first day of the 17th meeting was taken up by a discussion of the date of elections of heads of local self-government. And elements of the election campaign were also involved in the discussion. Deputy A. Chernetskiy proposed electing the governor and the mentioned heads separately, whereby the latter would be elected in April of next year. Arkadiy Mikhaylovich, intending to occupy the post of mayor of Yekaterinburg once again, said that he was hurting himself with his proposal, because he has a greater chance of winning in elections in August of this year than at a later time. In response, Deputy A. Bakov, also running for the mayor's "chair" of the capital of the Urals, doubted the clear advantage of A. Chernetskiy.

The Duma decreed the withdrawal from the Constitutional Court of its question on the constitutionality of the presidential edict prohibiting elections of administrative heads of subjects of the Russian Federation.

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***Russian Exodus From Dagestan Examined**

954F2584A Moscow ROSSIYA in Russian
17-23 May 95 No 13, p 7

[Unattributed article: "Dagestan—A Front-Line Russian Question"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Along with many other problems in Dagestan, one more has emerged: The exodus of Russians from the republic. Presented below are two views, perhaps both extreme, with the truth lying somewhere in between, thus merely proving the real existence of this problem.

The co-chairman of "Russkaya obshchina" ["Russian community"], Aleksey Gistsev, says that "Russkaya obshchina" is a socio-political organization founded by a group of activists and registered with the Republic of Dagestan Ministry of Justice. The program of "Russkaya obschina," in the words of the co-chairman, is simple: To protect Russians not only against encroachments on the part of the criminal world, but also against the authorities of Dagestan, who have deprived Russians of equal rights with other nationalities.

"The main problem for most Russians is how to leave Dagestan, which holds no promise for them or their children. This question, I am convinced, is asked by up to 80 percent of the Russians still living in the cities of the Republic. If they had a place to go, they would leave for the depths of Russia within a year. They are hindered from doing so by their poverty, by transport problems, and by the hope of "perhaps." The rampant and uncontrollable exodus of Russians from Dagestan will drag on for another 5-7 years. The Chechen War has only accelerated this process. As for the horrors of Russian life in pre-war Chechnya, the Russians in Dagestan live in a similar situation, are subjected to persecution by criminals of native nationalities, and are becoming the victims of manifestations of anti-Russian sentiments. This is observed even in the traditionally Russian rayons—Kizlyarskiy and Tarumovskiy. Not only are we being run out of our homes, but the Cossacks are being 'edged' out of their land."

In response to the question of who is to blame for this situation, Mr. Gistsev confidently answers:

"It is the government of Dagestan, which at the same time swears its allegiance to Russia and its "brotherhood" with Chechnya. While calling Russians the native people, the government continues to conduct a colonial policy in regard to the Cossacks. Not without the help of the government, Dagestan is taking hundreds of billions from poverty-stricken Russia by misappropriation from the banks or through non-returnable credits. For these billions, Russia could buy out all the Russians all at once, together with their apartments and all their belongings. That is why not allowing the exodus of Russians from Dagestan is one of the most important tasks of the government, which is for this purpose creating the illusion of waging a struggle against anti-Russian crime. In an export variant, so to speak, for the sake of Moscow. Yes, today the Dagestan authorities need the Russians, but not to the point where they would ruin the biographies of their own national criminals. The government will implement the policy of "friendship" toward the Russian people until the last Russian leaves, while at the same time provoking the growth of nationalism in the republic. In my opinion, this policy is hostile to the Russian people in Dagestan as well as in Russia—for which Dagestan is just as much of a burden as Dudayev's Chechnya."

The "Russkaya obshchina" co-chairman cited several examples of discrimination against Russians in Dagestan:

"There are many such examples: The first Russian airplane assembled in Dagestan has been sold, there is trade in Russian oil, while the dollars are going into someone's bottomless pocket and the Russian managing the Gosbank [State Bank] is being ousted. Last year, at the end of June, a Russian family was killed (a mother and son), and their apartment and property looted. They know about this in the prosecutor's offices, and in the Council of Ministers and in the State Soviet. Yet the matter is at a standstill. The Dagestan notaries have compiled a falsified will and power of attorney for transfer of property by the sculptor Chigirik, when he was threatened with death. Workers of the Minzdrav [Ministry of Health] were also mixed up in the crime. This was reported in the newspaper MAKHACHKALINSKIYE IZVESTIYA. Once again, everything remained without any consequences. Now even your newspaper has reported on how a mentally ill Russian woman was abducted from her apartment. For 6 days she was held prisoner by bandits who tried to move into her apartment. The case was handed over to the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the prosecutor's office of the RD [Republic of Dagestan], but was soon dropped. The Russian population is being refused the right to have a Russian mass media."

And they see the way out of this situation only in leaving Dagestan.

"The government of the republic must face the Russian problem and help all Russians wishing to leave Dagestan. A special service is needed for this purpose. The funds for aiding Russians who are leaving Dagestan may be taken from that portion of the federal funds which are intended for Russians, with consideration for their

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proportional numbers in the republic. It has long been time to put an end to the deception and hypocrisy."

In April of this year, a group of specialists from the Ministry on Affairs of Nationalities and Foreign Relations of the Republic of Dagestan responded to the statements made by "Russkaya obshchina."

"The interview of A. Gistsev contains some truth (about the position of Russians), but at the same time it also contains much falsehood, unsubstantiated statements, and false accusations (addressed at ethnic Dagestanis and the republic's government). Thus, A. Gistsev is correct in saying that today Russians are suffering, feeling unprotected, and being forced to leave Dagestan. The accusations in this regard are indeed founded. It is true, the law enforcement agencies are demonstrating clear helplessness in the struggle against housing racketeering in general, and that aimed at Russians in particular. Sometimes cases which have already been filed drag on so long that there is great doubt about the desire to objectively review them by those who are conducting them. Seeing all this, many Russian families, which under different circumstances would remain in Dagestan, are selling their apartments and hastily leaving. The war has accelerated this process."

"However, A. Gistsev is incorrect when he cites the hostile attitude of the Dagestanis toward the Russians as being the primary reason for the exodus of Russians from the republic, and when he accuses the government of Dagestan of anti-Russian policy."

"An objective person cannot help but see that the same troubles which Russians are experiencing are also being experienced by all other peoples of Dagestan, Russia and the CIS countries. Today, crime is rampant everywhere, and there is a tendency toward migration to territories on which ethnic fellow countrymen reside. In the past 3-4 years, an ever-increasing stream of ethnic Dagestanis has been coming to Dagestan from many regions of the former Union, where they had lived for many years and which they had not intended to leave. This process has become a sign of the times, and only a new upsurge of the economy is capable of stopping it, an improvement of the life of the people, an upper hand over crime and violence."

"As for the migration of Russians, here there are a number of characteristic peculiarities. The exodus of Russians began in the 60's. It was associated with the fact that, thanks to those same Russian specialists, every year the number of skilled blue-collar workers and engineering-technical workers increased in Dagestan in all spheres of the national economy. Due to the high birth rate in the republic, the labor surplus grew, as did the competition for jobs. Part of the Russians returned to Russia, to their relatives. Along with them, other residents of the republic of various nationalities also left Dagestan in search of work: Dargins and Avars—to Stavropol, Kumyks—to Krasnodar Kray, Lezgins—to Kazakhstan and Central Asia, and so forth. In Moscow alone there are over 30,000 ethnic Dagestanis working and studying. Most of them have families, houses and property. All this occurred as a regular, natural process. However, with the escalation of the criminal lawlessness, it is ever more acquiring a national coloration.

In the situation which has been formed today, one other factor has been added to the criminal factor, accelerating the migration of Russians from Dagestan: The economic niche which Russians predominantly occupied has greatly narrowed—there has been a disintegration of industrial production. And Russians are not eager to fill the commercial niche."

"The government of Dagestan is giving the Russian question the most serious attention. A special commission has been created on this problem. This has been done not for the sake of getting credits and subsidies, but because Dagestanis experience a feeling of deep gratitude toward the Russian people for their selfless help in uplifting the economy, culture and education. This is the first thing. And secondly, Russians do not have any historically formulated clans, tukhums [tribal groups], or associations of countrymen, and therefore there are many defenseless and lonely people, pensioners, etc. among them. And thirdly, the retention of Russian cadres is extremely important in the interests of production. Moreover, the exodus of Russians is not occurring without a trace: In Russia already today, Russians are prejudiced against ethnic Dagestanis, and a certain tension can be felt. This is a response reaction to the exodus of their fellow countrymen from our republic."

"Considering this circumstance, the Coordinating Council of the Northern Region has been created for solving the problems of Russians living in the Kizlyarsk region. Gistsev, however, insists that the subsidies are being given to us because of the Russians living in Dagestan, thereby lowering the President and the Government of Russia to the level of ordinary nationalists. The subsidies to the region are not humanitarian aid. There is a political and economic basis for them."

"Without a doubt, we cannot tolerate the situation whereby Russians feel themselves unprotected. However, A. Gistsev's proposal to the effect that this problem may be solved easily and quickly, simply by removing all Russians from Dagestan, is unacceptable to us."

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"Yes, the problem exists. However, it must be solved by other methods. First of all, it is necessary to heighten the responsibility of the law enforcement organs for increasing the effectiveness of the struggle against crime, and primarily against housing racketeering. Hearings must be held on this in the government, in parliament, and in the State Soviet, and all available information must be made public, so that Russians do not think that everyone has forgotten about them and that they are defenseless. For this reason, the voice of the Dagestanis—the simple people—must be heard in defense of the Russians. We should help young Russian boys and girls get into VUZes [higher educational institutions] and vocational-technical schools, setting special quotas for them, as had been previously set for rural residents."

"It is true that Russians have not yet created their own effective organization (Gistsev's 'Russkaya Obshchina', permeated by the poison of nationalism, does not count). Therefore, such a Russian organization is necessary in Dagestan. It is important to help create it, to give it assistance, to support the positive initiatives directed not toward inciting hatred among the ethnic Dagestanis and the Russians, as A. Gistsev does, but toward strengthening friendship between our truly fraternal peoples."

***Payment Defaults Major Problem in Kuban**

954F2576A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian 14 Jun 95 p 4

[Article by Vladimir Udachin, DELOVOY MIR correspondent in Krasnodar: "Payment Defaults Trouble Authorities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The problem of payment defaults is one of the most acute in the economy of Kuban. In a year, the sum of indebtedness has increased by 2.6 times, with 85 percent of the kray's enterprises showing signs of insolvency. The state of affairs at one plant or another, which was not always so dismal, is the result of the overall state of the country's economy. A large share of the working capital, complaints about the lack of which have long ago become customary, is being diverted from production. While 15 years ago, 40-50 percent of the working capital was "diverted" away from production, today it is much more. For example, for elevators—over 80 percent, and for petroleum processing—almost the same amount. It is a paradox, but a sector of industry which has no problems with sale, since fuel is always needed by everyone, bears losses of many billions.

Despite the huge mutual debts, on the whole throughout the kray claims are submitted for only 0.3 percent of the sum of indebtedness. Strangely, certain enterprises regularly ship products without pre-payment to TOO [limited liability partnerships] and commercial firms. One may conclude that the quality of administration and the interests of the managers are a significant motivator in accumulation and expenditure of one's own capital. And no matter how the situation in the country is formulated, if we do not overcome these phenomena, we cannot expect a cardinal improvement in the kray's economic situation.

In connection with this, the kray administration has adopted a decree aimed at stabilizing the solvency of Kuban industry. Henceforth, the executive authorities will participate in provision of financial support to enterprises of kray and federal forms of ownership, and will also control the expenditure of allocated funds. Training programs will be organized for managers of debtor enterprises. In order to reduce the mutual indebtedness of legal entities in the kray, work will be stepped up on introduction of promissory note circulation, as well as a system of electronic inter-bank accounting, and a clearinghouse will be established. One of the commercial banks of Kuban will be named as the authorized representative of the kray administration for improving the condition of insolvent enterprises.

The kray administration will examine the possibility of re-profiling ineffective enterprises for the manufacture of products which are in demand.

***Former Vladivostok Mayor on Conflict With Kray Authorities**

954E1075A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 7 Jun 95 p 14

[Article by Leonid Berres: Mayors Power Not Secure in Russia]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Russian General Prosecutors Office is continuing its investigation in connection with false charges filed against Vladivostok mayor Viktor Cherepkov and his son Vladimir. In the meantime, Viktor Cherepkov has related to a KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent the story of his conflict with the Maritime Kray administration and the details of his unique work in his eight months as mayor.*

Viktor Cherepkov's Biography

Cherepkov was born in Ryazan Oblast in 1942 in a family with 11 other children. At the age of eight he began working herding livestock. Because of his job he had no time to go to school, and he completed secondary school by correspondence at age 17. In 1959 he went on a Komsomol assignment to work at the Bratsk Hydroelectric Power Plant. There he set up the "Mercy, Health and Charity Social Fund," and has since

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paid 25 percent of his salary into it. In 1962 he was drafted and served in the Pacific Fleet on board a nuclear submarine. He left the service after four years with a lieutenant's rank. After his military service he went to do construction work in Kazakhstan, but after a year returned to Vladivostok due to an officer shortage in the fleet. Over a three-year period he graduated from two departments of the Higher Naval School. In 1977 he was transferred to a local military research institute. He worked there for 17 years, receiving national honors as an efficiency expert. He is known for his efforts in defense of human rights. While a deputy of the Maritime Kray Soviet he used a concealed camera to film accounts by sailors on Russkiy Island about how they were being intentionally exterminated. Later this material was used as the basis for criminal charges, and the military unit in question was disbanded. According to him, in his whole life he has never once had a drink, smoked or cursed. Viktor Cherepkov is married and has a 20-year-old son.

Maritime Krays Leading Capitalists Struggle for Power

At the beginning of 1993 the AO Primorskaya aktsionernaya korporatsiya proizvoditeley [Maritime Stock Corporation of Producers Joint-Stock Company] (PAKT) became the most influential financial group in the kray by uniting the heads of approximately 200 of Maritime Krays largest enterprises. PAKTs organizers successfully bought up controlling blocks of stock in Maritime Kray enterprises. This was mainly done through closed subscription to shares in enterprises undergoing privatization, since the PAKT people were also heads of many of the enterprises. Loans obtained by each firm were used when shares were purchased in various forms. Incidentally, the current head of the kray administration, Yevgeniy Nazdratenko, was at the time president of Vostok Mining Company in Dalnegorsk — one of PAKTs founders.

PAKT became the principal political and economic group supporting Nazdratenko. After the chief of the kray administration took office in May 1993, Nazdratenko resigned from the board of PAKT founders. In this connection Cherepkovs opinion of Nazdratenko is of interest: ...his wilderness prospector's intellect, his highly vulnerable past and present history, and his lack of a firm political position allowed the people behind PAKT to control him easily for their own purposes.

The Vladivostok mayoral election was slated for 29 June 1993. PAKTs candidate for mayor was its president, Boris Fadeyev. In Cherepkovs opinion, his [Cherepkovs] candidacy bothered the PAKT camp. It is possible that the PAKT people were put off by Cherepkovs programs to fight corruption in government and police agencies, or by Cherepkovs past human rights activism (it was widely known that Cherepkov had become famous through his work with the commission on Russkiy Island, where several sailors starved to death).

According to Cherepkov, prior to the mayoral election Nazdratenko summoned him to his office and offered him the job of vice-governor and a chance to earn billionsin exchange for withdrawing his candidacy.

True, Nazdratenko has told a KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent that he did not make that offer to Cherepkov. Furthermore, Nazdratenko denies that his conflict with Cherepkov was due to the latters refusal to support PAKT.

Whatever the case, Viktor Cherepkov was elected. According to him, that moment was preceded by one unpleasant event: in early June an unidentified assailant shot at him. A bullet flew over the mayoral candidates head. The assailant fled, and Cherepkov did not go to the police.

The Kray Administration Unloads Property

According to Viktor Cherepkov, his relations with Nazdratenko worsened in 1993, after the presidential administrations control department uncovered cases of corruption and other abuses in the kray.

On 14 December 1993 Ministry of Internal Affairs head Viktor Yerin sent Sergey Filatov, head of the presidential administration, a letter indicating that Yevgeniy Nazdratenko and his deputies Anatoliy Pavlov and Igor Lebedintsev had established the Merkuriy Commercial Bank in violation of the presidential edict On Efforts To Combat Corruption in State Service, and that press committee chairman Vladimir Shkrabov was a PAKT shareholder. In addition, Pavlov was the founder of the Smena Limited Company and the Kommersant Joint-Stock Company, while Lebedintsev was head of the Super and Ofis-Tsentr limiteds.

Incidentally, in the fall of 1993 Lebedintsev still held 28,515 shares in Russias largest fishing company, the AO "Vladivostokskaya baza tralovogo i refrizheratornogo flota" [Vladivostok Trawler and Refrigerated Fleet Base Joint-Stock Company] (VBTRF), but got rid of them in time by giving them to his wife Galina. Igor Lebedintsev had purchased those shares through closed subscription, as at the time he was director of VBTRF. Today the market value of those shares (at the price quoted on the Vladivostok Stock Market on 31 May) is approximately $110,000.

It is likely that Lebedinets "got rid of" the shares after the Russian presidential administration's Control Department on 25 November 1993 issued kray administra-

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tion chief Yevgeniy Nazdratenko a reprimand under the heading "On Elimination of Shortcomings in the Operations of Maritime Kray Administration in Connection With Privatization and Foreign Economic Activity." This also indicated that Vladivostok administration chief Viktor Cherepkov owned the IChP "Miloserdiye, zdorovye i blagotvoritelnost" [Mercy, Health and Charity Social Fund].

As a result Nazdratenko, Lebedinets and Cherepkov resigned from the boards of all commercial structures, while Pavlov and Shkrabov quit their government jobs. In addition, at the same time the Maritime Kray Internal Affairs Administration was investigating a particularly large case of tax evasion by PAKT in 1992-93. But the case was dismissed due to lack of evidence.

Power Slips Out of the Mayor's Hands

Viktor Cherepkov spent approximately eight months in the mayor's office. Each of those months was marred by numerous unpleasant incidents. On the very first day there was not a single deputy mayor present at city hall, and many department heads were absent as well. They had gone on vacation. Subsequently the majority of them took new jobs with the kray administration without even returning to city hall. Furthermore, in July 1993 an ordinance issued by the kray financial administration cut tax payments to the city in half and, in Cherepkov's opinion, "drove Vladivostok into debt." And in December 1993 Nazdratenko issued a decree under which the city's enterprises were required to pay all their taxes directly into the kray budget.

Kray administration deputy chief Stegniy informed the new mayor in September 1993 that on 10 March 1993 the kray administration's commission on quotas and licensing had refused to grant the mayor's office export quotas for fish products, timber and chemical fertilizer. This was supposedly done because the city administration had not accounted for its 1992 quota sales.

In September 1993 five city rayons were removed from mayor Cherepkov's jurisdiction. Officially, the rayon administration chiefs had sent a written request to Nazdratenko asking to be transferred to his jurisdiction, as it was allegedly impossible to work with Cherepkov and he did not trust them. Cherepkov calls those claims absurd. The rayons were not legally placed under new jurisdiction, yet in fact, according to Cherepkov, the heads of those rayons stopped taking directions from him.

Finally, on 3 November 1993, by order of the Maritime Kray Administration Cherepkov was required to get kray administration permission for trips outside the kray and for written communications with federal agencies, since allegedly under Article 29 of the law "On Local Self-Government" a local administration is accountable to the appropriate higher-level executive authority. Incidentally, the law "On Kray and Oblast Soviets..." makes no mention of this kind of control over local government, and the mayor received a finding so stating from the Russian Ministry of Justice.

Metal Pipes Put To Use

According to Cherepkov, in the fall of 1993, by a strange coincidence of circumstances, part of the pipes in the central pipeline of Vladivostok's district heating system were cut out, and some of the city's rayons were left without heat. It is still not clear who gave the orders to do this, but in Cherepkov's opinion the act was an effort to discredit the mayor.

According to Mr. Cherepkov, he feared for his life the whole eight months. In August 1993 he was attacked outside his home by five men who began choking him, demanding that he resign. But the mayor managed to escape from his assailants.

After six months in office, Cherepkov's drivers refused to drive him and he was forced to ride in large dump trucks that were too difficult to ram. Cherepkov did not live at home, fearing a terrorist act.

Finally, in December 1993 the kray administration began to oppose mayor Cherepkov openly. At a 29 December meeting of the kray commission on emergency situations Igor Lebedinets, the kray's vice-governor (and now, since February 1995, chairman of the Maritime Kray Duma), announced that due to a heavy snowfall and the mayor's ineptitude there had been breakdowns in Vladivostok's electric power supply and snow removal operations, causing traffic jams and forcing "expectant mothers to deliver their children right in the snow" before they could reach maternity clinics. On these grounds the kray commission for emergency situations requested that the kray's governor ask federal agencies to remove Cherepkov from his post as chief of Vladivostok Administration.

However, a KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent was told by the kray health care administration that not a single case of a child being "born in the snow" had been reported during that snowfall — all the mothers did in fact reach medical facilities in time.

The Police Do Their Job

Since the beginning of 1994 the police have also been involved in the slander campaign against Cherepkov. As General Prosecutor's Office staff have now learned, back in February 1994 senior operations officers from

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the kray internal affairs administration Vladimir Dudin and Aleksandr Garbushinym, presenting themselves as Federal Counterintelligence Service agents, attempted to obtain compromising information on Cherepkov from a certain enlisted man (whose name has not been disclosed), since prior to induction that individual had worked in the mayor's office. For that purpose they brought him from Komsomolsk-na-Amure, where he was stationed, to Ussuriysk. There the policemen put the soldier in an investigation room and demanded that he slander the mayor. The soldier made the required statements and was released. But afterwards he went straight to Vladivostok and told Cherepkov all about the incident. The mayor videotaped the soldier's story and later turned the tape over to the General Prosecutor's Office.

In the end a case was made out of a different incident. As KOMMERSANT-DAILY has written before, policeman Valeriy Bugrov, presenting himself as Valeriy Volkov, chairman of the Vikhr Association in Moscow, unsuccessfully attempted to give Cherepkov a bribe. Yet later the false Volkov testified that the mayor had in fact accepted the money. In March of this year an investigator signed an order relieving Cherepkov of his duties, and soon after that OMON officers carried Viktor Cherepkov out of city hall.

It is interesting to note that soon after the case was filed but before Cherepkov had been indicted Valeriy Vasilenko, head of the kray prosecutor's office, made the following statement to the local press: "In a normal situation, if he were not Cherepkov, he would already be locked up...! He would be singing in the investigation room, faced with this kind of evidence." (quoted from the newspaper VLADIVOSTOK, 16 February 1994). However, Vasilenko actually got a stern reprimand from Russia's interim general prosecutor over the Cherepkov case.

Now Cherepkov has reported several new details about how the fraudulent case against him was staged. For example, it has come to light that during a search of the mayor's office the person present as an official witness to the search was the wife of the head of police unit conducting the search, Lyudmila Dudina, wearing a white wig. Yet in the police report she was listed as Tashkent resident Svetlana Lapteva. Incidentally, Dudin himself is currently under arrest.

In addition, during investigation of the mayor's case a certain Aleksandr Chepkevich came forward and stated that he had also given a bribe of one million rubles to Cherepkov in exchange for the mayor getting him a job as a driver with the city's motor pool. General Prosecutor's Office officials learned that Chepkevich is in fact Aleksandr Shulpin, an uncle of Lyubov Dudina, and that he had not given the mayor any bribe at all.

There was also a certain Sergey Bukharin, who told investigators from the kray internal affairs administration that he had received money from Cherepkov in exchange for certain services. However, it turned out that Bukharin was actually a counterfeiter named Sergey Blinov. And the money allegedly received by him from the mayor turned out to be marked with the same substance as the R1.25 million found in the mayor's office during the search. It appears that the false Bukharin was needed to provide evidence that Cherepkov had spent the money he had supposedly received from the false "Afghan" Volkov.

Incidentally, as KOMMERSANT-DAILY wrote during the investigation, on 2 August 1994 an attempt was made on Viktor Cherepkov's life. Just a few hours before Cherepkov had spoken over local radio, promising to name the names of those who had fabricated charges against him and his son. Later three unidentified individuals kidnapped the mayor near his home and drove him to Bolshoy Uliss Bay, but Cherepkov managed to escape.

Initial Outcome of the Mayor's Case

Eventually, in November 1994, Cherepkov's case was dismissed for lack of evidence, but at the same time other charges were filed, this time in connection with the fictitious bribe. Kray internal affairs administration officers Dudin, Gorbushin and Bugrov were arrested in May 1995. Soon afterward, Igor Lebedinets went to Moscow to demand on behalf of the local duma that the General Prosecutor's Office release Dudin. However, the General Prosecutor's Office refused to do so.

Besides the kray prosecutor, reprimands have already been issued to Vladivostok prosecutor Vyacheslav Yaroshenko and the deputy prosecutor for Frunzenskiy Rayon, Aleksandr Vysotskiy. In February 1995 Viktor Yerin fired Maritime Kray Internal Affairs Administration chief Vladimir Ippatov for overstepping his authority and abusing his official position in connection with the prosecution of Cherepkov. It is interesting to note that back in June 1994 Ippatov's personal chauffeur was arrested and charged with murder. He had promised two acquaintances to help them buy an apartment but had then murdered and robbed them.

Commenting on the case of Vladivostok's mayor, Yevgeniy Nazdratenko told a KOMMERSANT-DAILY correspondent that he still believes that Viktor Cherepkov demonstrated a complete lack of professionalism as mayor of Vladivostok, and that therefore his removal from office was proper.

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Legally, Viktor Cherepkov Is Still Mayor of Vladivostok

On **5 December 1994**, following the dismissal of his case, Viktor Cherepkov issues a decree announcing his intention to assume the duties of mayor. However, he is not permitted to enter city hall. Interim mayor Konstantin Tolstoshein announces that "a decision by the General Prosecutor's Office is not a binding order" to him.

On **15 December 1994** Cherepkov issues a decree declaring that actions taken by Tolstoshein as interim mayor were illegal, then files suit against him.

On **23 December 1994** Boris Yeltsin issues an edict relieving the mayor of Vladivostok of his duties due to the length of time during which he had not performed those duties, and in response to a request from administration chiefs in Vladivostok.

On **11 January 1995** Cherepkov files a suit in Moscow's Lefortovo Court asking that Yeltsin's edict be overturned. In addition, in compliance with the law "On Local Self-Government in Russia" the court suspends the edict until the court returns its decision, as the edict is in violation of "the rights and legitimate interests of Vladivostok's citizens." Furthermore, in Cherepkov's opinion the president of Russia had no right to dismiss a mayor elected by the people of the city, since in such cases the Constitution does not grant the executive branch the right to intervene in matters of local self-government (points 1, 2, 3 and 4, Article 3, and Article 12, Chapter 1, as well as the second part of Article 130 and Article 133, Chapter 8).

On **26 January** Yevgeniy Nazdratenko, chief of Maritime Kray Administration, appoints Tolstoshein mayor of Vladivostok.

On **12 April** Cherepkov is summoned to the office of Sergey Filatov, chief of the presidential administration. Filatov admits that the president had been misinformed and that the edict should be rescinded.

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